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COMMENTS 
FISHER’S CAUTIONARY TALE AND THE URGENT NEED 
FOR EQUAL ACCESS TO AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION 
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson∗ 
Debates over race-conscious affirmative action in higher education 
admissions remain central to discussions about the meaning of equality 
and the role of education in advancing equal opportunity.1  These de-
bates continued last Term in the Supreme Court when, for only the  
second time in the Supreme Court’s history, the Court held that an in-
stitution of higher education may consider an applicant’s race as a fac-
tor to achieve diversity’s educational benefits.2  In Fisher v. University 
of Texas at Austin (Fisher II),3 the Court held that the University of 
Texas had presented sufficient evidence to establish that its pursuit of 
the educational benefits of diversity through a race-conscious admis-
sions policy satisfied the Court’s demanding strict scrutiny inquiry.4  
Some view Fisher II as cause for celebration and a victory for equal 
educational opportunity,5 while those opposed to affirmative action 
vow to continue their battle against it and decry such policies as dis-
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 1 See Sumi Cho, From Massive Resistance, to Passive Resistance, to Righteous Resistance: 
Understanding the Culture Wars from Brown to Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 834–35 (2005); 
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Comment: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: 
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 135, 140, 202–03 (2003). 
 2 The first case to uphold the consideration of race in university admissions was Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  Grutter affirmed the contention by Justice Powell in Regents of the 
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Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334–35 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315–17 (opinion of Powell, J.)).  
 3 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 4 Id. at 2210–14.  
 5 See, e.g., Press Release, Civil Rights Project, UCLA, Statement by Civil Rights Project on 
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criminatory.6  Harvard University and the University of North Caroli-
na are currently being sued over their consideration of race in admit-
ting students.7  A coalition of Asian American organizations filed com-
plaints with the United States Department of Education (DOE) 
against Brown University, Dartmouth College, and Yale University in 
May 2016, alleging race-based discrimination in admissions at these 
schools.8  Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, and Washington have banned the consideration of race in 
admissions by state universities,9 and the Court has upheld the lawful-
ness of such bans.10 
As these debates continue, it is important to understand that the 
Court’s decisions on affirmative action and educational opportunity 
establish a fundamental conflict.  The Court’s jurisprudence on af-
firmative action requires an endpoint for affirmative action.  In 2003, 
the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger11 stated that affirmative action to en-
sure diversity’s educational benefits must eventually come to end and 
suggested that that end point would be twenty-five years after 
Grutter.12  In prior opinions, the Court also has noted the importance 
of an end to the consideration of race.13  Even if a liberal majority on 
the Court extends the life of affirmative action in university admis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See Robert Barnes, Justices Deliver Surprising Boost to Backers of Affirmative Action, 
WASH. POST, June 24, 2016, at A1; Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Race-Aware Admissions, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2016, at A1; Emma Brown & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Affirmative Action Ad-
vocates Shocked — and Thrilled — by Supreme Court’s Ruling in University of Texas Case, 
WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/06/23 
/affirmative-action-advocates-shocked-and-thrilled-by-supreme-courts-ruling-in-university-of 
-texas-case [https://perma.cc/EK4E-MJ8B]. 
 7 Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 
1:14-cv-14176 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2014); Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of 
N.C., No. 1:14cv00954 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2014); see also Marina N. Bolotnikova, Harvard’s 
Stake in the Fisher v. Texas Affirmative Action Case, HARV. MAG. (June 23, 2016), http:// 
harvardmagazine.com/2016/06/supreme-court-rejects-abigail-fisher-s-challenge-to-affirmative 
-action [https://perma.cc/3GTG-96KJ] (discussing Harvard University’s amicus brief in support of 
the University of Texas in Fisher II and the pending litigation against Harvard alleging discrimi-
nation against Asian Americans in admissions). 
 8 Douglas Belkin, Ivy Schools Under Fire on Admissions, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2016, at A2. 
 9 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; NEB. 
CONST. art. I, § 30; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 187-A:16-a (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 
(2014); Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999) (Governor Jeb Bush’s “One Florida Initiative”); 
David G. Savage, Court Finds Middle Ground on Race, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1.  For 
additional information on state ballot initiatives on affirmative action, see Affirmative Action: 
State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Apr. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research 
/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx [https://perma.cc/CH4K-JH5K]. 
 10 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014). 
 11 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 12 Id. at 342–43. 
 13 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193, 208–09 (1979). 
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sions beyond Grutter’s 2028 deadline, the natural pendulum swings of 
the Court’s composition are likely to lead to a conservative-leaning 
Court that eventually insists on an end to affirmative action. 
Yet despite insistence on an end point for affirmative action, the 
Court’s jurisprudence on equal educational opportunity has frustrated 
attempts at reform that might eventually obviate the need for affirma-
tive action.  Postsecondary institutions consider the race of applicants 
in substantial part because of the racial achievement gap between ap-
plicants on standardized test scores and the systemic disparities within 
elementary and secondary education that cause these gaps.14  The 
Court closed a powerful door to addressing those gaps in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.15  In Rodriguez, the Court 
held that the United States Constitution neither recognizes a right to 
education nor provides a remedy for funding disparities between dis-
tricts in a state.16  While acknowledging the need for state funding re-
form, Rodriguez left such reforms to the laboratory of the states.17  
Although some reform has occurred, this laboratory has too often 
proven that states are unwilling to provide the equal access to an ex-
cellent education that all children deserve.18  As a result, widespread 
racial and socioeconomic disparities in educational opportunity persist 
and remain a principal cause of the achievement gap between low-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHARE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CON-
SEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 1–3, 18–
23 (1998).  Counsel for the University of Texas acknowledged these reasons for the University’s 
use of affirmative action at oral argument in Fisher II.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 49,  
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), h t t p s : / / w w w . s u p r e m e c o u r t . g o v / o r a l _ a r g u m e n t s/ a r g u m e n t 
_ t r a n s c r i p t s / 1 4 - 9 8 1 _ o n j q . p d f [h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / U S 7 U - A 2 S N].  Justice Sotomayor also acknowl-
edged the standardized test score gap as a factor that made it more difficult to admit  
African American students.  See id. at 92.  Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon’s scholarship has 
described “improvement in the technology of mental testing,” Kimberly West-Faulcon, More In-
telligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1235, 1272 (2011), and insight-
fully demonstrated how standardized tests designed according to more accurate theories of intelli-
gence have been shown to reduce the gap between African American and white test scores from 
one standard deviation to approximately one half or one fourth of that amount or less with similar 
and sometimes better predictive power.  See id. at 1272–77. 
 15 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).  The Court also foreclosed litigation challenges to the disparate racial 
impact of educational disparities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), when it held that the Act’s disparate impact regulations could not 
be enforced in court.  Id. at 288–93. 
 16 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–37. 
 17 See id. at 58. 
 18 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Creating New Pathways to Equal 
Educational Opportunity, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW 
PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 263, 264, 268–70 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. 
& Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds., 2015) [hereinafter THE ENDURING LEGACY OF 
RODRIGUEZ]; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 959, 963–64 (2015) (identifying equal access to an excellent education as the proper goal of 
education reform and defining this phrase). 
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income and minority students and their more affluent and white 
peers.19  Therefore, although the Court insists that affirmative action 
must eventually end, the Court has washed its hands of the underlying 
opportunity gaps that lead institutions to rely on affirmative action. 
In this Comment, I argue that much greater care and attention 
must be paid to the educational opportunity gaps and resulting 
achievement gaps that prompt many colleges and universities to rely 
on affirmative action.  Increased attention to greater equality and ex-
cellence in elementary and secondary education can help reduce or 
eliminate the need for affirmative action, which is an approach that 
fundamentally aims to ensure equality.20  Without additional attention 
to closing opportunity gaps, the Court may declare that the time has 
come for affirmative action to end, but the United States will not be 
equipped to maintain diverse, selective postsecondary institutions21 
and the many benefits that they bring.22 
Before presenting a long-term plan to close educational opportunity 
and achievement gaps, I explain how, in the near term, it is important 
to understand the impact that Fisher II will have on the ability of in-
stitutions to achieve diversity in their entering classes.  In this regard, 
Fisher II offers some assistance to institutions that want to employ af-
firmative action, but also provides a cautionary tale about the de-
manding evidentiary burden that these institutions must carry to pre-
vail.  Thus, Fisher II should serve less as a cause for celebration and 
more as a call to action for those who need to prepare the evidentiary 
record and research that defending affirmative action will require. 
Given the Court’s insistence on the importance of considering race-
neutral alternatives, I also recommend that universities consider “edu-
cational disadvantage” as a race-neutral alternative in admissions.  I 
first describe the educational disadvantages that confront many stu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Robinson, supra note 18, at 961–62; Kevin G. Welner & Prudence L. Carter, Achieve-
ment Gaps Arise from Opportunity Gaps, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT 
AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD AN EVEN CHANCE 1, 1–3 (Prudence L. Carter & 
Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013) [hereinafter CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP]; infra section II.A, 
pp. 206–10. 
 20 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003) (discussing how diversity in higher ed-
ucation institutions helps achieve the important societal aims of making higher education accessi-
ble for all races, preparing students for a diverse workforce, and developing diverse leaders); City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (noting that the ultimate aim of the re-
medial consideration of race is to advance equality).  For an early legal analysis of the efforts of 
affirmative action to achieve equality, see generally Walter J. Leonard, Introduction: A Step To-
ward Equality: Affirmative Action and Equal Employment Opportunity, 4 BLACK L.J. 214 (1975). 
 21 Only an estimated twenty to thirty percent of all four-year institutions are selective.  See 
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 15.  Most institutions accept all qualified applicants.  Id. 
 22 Id. at 276, 279 (explaining that diverse postsecondary institutions yield such benefits as stu-
dents learning to interact with individuals of other races in an increasingly diverse society, gradu-
ates contributing leadership and civic participation, and the institutions advancing the aims of a 
democratic society). 
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dents, particularly minority and poor students.  I contend that the 
Court should not end affirmative action in higher education until these 
educational disadvantages are eradicated.  I then explore how institu-
tions could consider educational disadvantage in ways that promote 
the educational benefits of diversity.  As discussed below, research re-
veals that a variety of forms of educational disadvantage inflict greater 
harm on minority students.  Universities could structure their recogni-
tion of educational disadvantage in admissions in ways that 
acknowledge the racial disparities in educational opportunity that 
cause the achievement gap, while considering the full scope of educa-
tional disadvantages in ways that prevent educational disadvantage 
from serving as a proxy for race. 
I then present my long-term theory for how to close opportunity 
gaps by explaining the need for federal leadership for reform because 
of the ineffectiveness of state and local efforts.  My theory builds on 
federal policymaking strengths, while also creating new forms of state 
and local control over education.23  My approach envisions the federal 
government serving as the ultimate guarantor of equal access to an ex-
cellent education.  The federal government would partner with the 
states in ways that make achieving this essential national goal a reality.  
In addition, the Court should overturn Rodriguez to provide a uniform 
federal remedy for closing opportunity gaps.  Collectively, these efforts 
can help to reduce reliance on affirmative action to address achieve-
ment gaps and prepare selective institutions for the eventual demise of 
affirmative action. 
This Comment proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the admis-
sions program at the University of Texas at Austin and summarizes the 
Fisher I24 and II opinions.  Part I also analyzes how Fisher II may 
benefit universities that seek to consider an applicant’s race among 
many factors to assemble a diverse class.  Part I examines how, at the 
same time,  Fisher II may make it harder for universities that do so to 
withstand the Court’s demanding evidentiary burden.  This Comment 
then turns to both a short- and long-term approach that can help insti-
tutions and the nation to prepare for the eventual demise of affirma-
tive action.  Part II describes the nature and breadth of the education-
al opportunity gap and contends that, in the short term, universities 
should consider educational disadvantage as a positive race-neutral 
factor that could assist institutions in assembling a diverse class.  
Turning to a longer-term solution, Part III analyzes how the federal 
government, including the Supreme Court, should take action that can 
close the elementary and secondary educational opportunity and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 Robinson, supra note 18, at 984–85, 1014–16. 
 24 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
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achievement gaps in ways that can help institutions enroll diverse stu-
dent bodies even after affirmative action ends. 
I.  A CRITIQUE OF FISHER II’S MIXED MESSAGES 
Fisher II sends mixed signals to institutions that employ affirma-
tive action.  Several aspects of Fisher II can be interpreted to assist in-
stitutions that employ affirmative action.  However, Fisher II also ap-
plied a demanding evidentiary burden to establish the constitutionality 
of affirmative action.  This Part begins with a summary of the admis-
sions plan at the University of Texas at Austin and the Fisher I and II 
decisions.  It then considers the mixed messages within Fisher II and 
concludes that it provides a cautionary tale to institutions that employ 
affirmative action. 
A.  Fisher I and II 
The Fisher case challenged admissions standards at the University 
of Texas at Austin (the University).25  In its ongoing efforts to admit a 
diverse student body, the University has employed three programs to 
admit candidates in recent decades.26  First, prior to 1997, the  
University considered an Academic Index (AI) — which assigns a nu-
merical score to the candidate’s academic performance in high school 
and standardized test scores — and the candidate’s race.27  The Fifth 
Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas28 that this approach violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it did not advance a compelling state 
interest as required by the Supreme Court for the consideration of an 
individual’s race.29 
In response to the Hopwood decision, the University ended its con-
sideration of race and developed a Personal Achievement Index (PAI) 
to consider along with the AI.30  The PAI involves a holistic review of 
how an applicant can contribute to the University by assessing an ap-
plicant’s work experience, leadership, extracurricular activities, com-
munity service, and awards, as well as any unique circumstances that 
provide information on the background of a student.31  The Texas leg-
islature also responded to Hopwood in 1997 by adopting the Top Ten 
Percent Law, which offers automatic acceptance to any state university 
to any student from Texas who graduates within the top ten percent of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 Id. at 2415. 
 26 Id. at 2419–20. 
 27 Id. at 2415. 
 28 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 29 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2415 (citing Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955). 
 30 See id.  
 31 See id. at 2415–16. 
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her or his high school class.32  In response, the University revised its 
admissions approach to incorporate the Top Ten Percent Law in 
1998.33  This approach first admitted students under the Top Ten  
Percent Law and admitted the remaining students by combining con-
sideration of the AI and PAI scores.34  This approach did not consider 
race.35 
After the United States Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of race 
as a factor that could be considered within a candidate’s total applica-
tion to achieve diversity in Grutter,36 the University initiated a one-
year study to determine whether its admissions approach enabled the 
University to offer diversity’s educational benefits.37  After concluding 
that it was not providing those benefits, the University revised its ad-
missions approach in 2004 to the approach challenged by Abigail Fish-
er.38  This approach includes an applicant’s race as one element within 
the PAI score.39  Once applicants receive a PAI and an AI score, these 
combined scores are plotted on a grid and the University admits “[a]ll 
students in the cells falling above a certain line.”40 
Fisher, who is white, applied to the University of Texas at Austin to 
be admitted in 2008 and was denied admission.  She sued the  
University for considering race when it admits students.41  Fisher ar-
gued that this admissions approach violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.42  A federal district court granted summary judgment to the 
University, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision.43  The Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion interpreted Grutter to require courts to defer to the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See id. at 2416 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009)).  The percentage 
admitted each year can vary from the ten percent in the initial law.  See TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 51.803(a) (West 2015). 
 33 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 37 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 38 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
 39 Id.  The PAI score is determined by two components: a score on two required essays and a 
full-file review that determines the Personal Achievement Score (PAS).  Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 
2206.  The PAS is determined by a whole file review that examines three factors: (1) the appli-
cant’s essays; (2) supplemental information, such as recommendation letters, writing samples, and 
resumes; and (3) an “applicant’s potential contributions to the University’s student body based on 
the applicant’s leadership experience, extracurricular activities, awards/honors, community ser-
vice, and other ‘special circumstances,’” with “special circumstances” including “socioeconomic 
status of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s family responsibilities, whether the applicant lives 
in a single-parent home, the applicant’s SAT score in relation to the average SAT score at the ap-
plicant’s school, the language spoken at the applicant’s home, and, finally, the applicant’s race.”  
Id. 
 40 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 41 Id. at 2415. 
 42 Id. at 2417. 
 43 Id.  
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University’s decision regarding both how it defined the benefits of di-
versity that established a compelling interest and whether the  
University’s admissions approach satisfied strict scrutiny’s narrow tai-
loring requirements.44 
In Fisher I, the Supreme Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion and remanded the case.45  The Court held that the University 
must satisfy strict scrutiny by proving that the consideration of race 
advances a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.46  It reaffirmed that a court should provide some 
deference to a university’s academic decision that diversity’s educa-
tional benefits form a critical element of its mission.47  This standard 
would require a university to offer a “reasoned, principled explanation 
for the academic decision.”48  In overruling the Fifth Circuit, however, 
the Court ruled that “no deference” should be given to a university on 
whether its approach to achieving diversity’s educational benefits is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.49  Instead, a university must 
prove that race must be considered to reap diversity’s educational 
benefits, and the court must be convinced that “no workable race-
neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversi-
ty.”50  In light of the lower court’s erroneous deference to the  
University on the narrow tailoring inquiry, the Court remanded the 
case to the Fifth Circuit so it could apply the proper interpretation of 
strict scrutiny.51  On remand, the Fifth Circuit again upheld the Uni-
versity’s consideration of race in holistic review as necessary to achieve 
the diversity that assists its academic mission.52  Fisher again appealed 
to the Supreme Court. 
In Fisher II, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for the Court that 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit and highlighted three key legal principles 
from Fisher I.  First, strict scrutiny requires a university to articulate 
“with clarity” that its aim in using race in admissions is both lawful 
under the Constitution and compelling, and that the use of race is nec-
essary to accomplish that aim.53  Second, the Court will provide some 
deference to the academic judgment to seek “the educational benefits 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 2421–22.  Justice Kagan did not participate in the decision.  Id. at 2422.  Justices  
Scalia and Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions.  Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2422–32 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Ginsburg dissented.  Id. at 2432–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 46 Id. at 2419 (majority opinion). 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 2420. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 2421–22. 
 52 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 656–57 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 53 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208. 
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that flow from student body diversity” and a university’s “reasoned, 
principled explanation” for its decision “that a diverse student body 
would serve its educational goals.”54  Third, the Court will not give 
any deference to a university during the narrow tailoring analysis of 
strict scrutiny.55 
Justice Kennedy then observed that the University’s program is 
“sui generis” because it combines a holistic approach along with a per-
centage plan.56  Given Fisher’s failure to earn grades within the top 
ten percent of her high school class, she did not qualify for over  
seventy-five percent of the spaces allocated for the entering class.57  
Fisher did not challenge the constitutionality of the Top Ten Percent 
Plan.  As a result, the Court lacked information about the students 
who were admitted under this plan and how they compared to holistic 
review admittees in advancing the diversity of the University.58  The 
Court declined to remand the case to gather such information because 
the remand would result in only three years of data about the differ-
ences between these students.59  The Texas Legislature’s adoption of 
the Top Ten Percent Plan circumscribed the options for the Universi-
ty’s admissions program, a fact that Justice Kennedy noted “may limit 
[the opinion’s] value for prospective guidance.”60 
Even though the University was required by law to employ the Top 
Ten Percent Plan, it still bore the burden to engage in periodic review 
of the legality and effectiveness of its admissions policy.  The Court 
noted that the University engaged in periodic review of the program.61  
It urged the University to continue its ongoing assessment of data and 
the experience of students so that the University could modify its ad-
missions program to respond to “changing circumstances” and use race 
only to the extent necessary.62 
The Court also rejected Fisher’s principal arguments against the 
affirmative action plan.  The Court disagreed with the contention that 
the University had not clearly defined its compelling interest.63  The 
University had noted a variety of benefits from enrolling a diverse 
student body, including preparing students for the growing diversity 
within workplaces and in society, reducing stereotypes, increasing un-
derstanding among racial groups, creating leaders with adequate legit-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Id. (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 2209. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 2210. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. at 2210–11. 
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imacy in the public’s eyes, offering an academic experience that in-
cludes a rigorous dialogue, and cultivating experience with other cul-
tures.64  The University determined that its race-neutral admissions 
policies had not yielded the educational benefits of diversity.  The 
Court explained: 
  Increasing minority enrollment may be instrumental to these educa-
tional benefits [of diversity], but it is not . . . a goal that can or should be 
reduced to pure numbers.  Indeed, since the University is prohibited from 
seeking a particular number or quota of minority students, it cannot be 
faulted for failing to specify the particular level of minority enrollment at 
which it believes the educational benefits of diversity will be obtained.65 
The University’s justification for pursuing diversity had established 
the “reasoned, principled explanation” for its pursuit of these goals.66 
The Court further rejected Fisher’s argument that the University 
had achieved a critical mass of diverse students through the Top Ten 
Percent Plan combined with holistic review that did not consider race.  
The Court noted the extensive review that led the University to deter-
mine that the race-neutral policies were unsuccessful.67  The Court al-
so highlighted data that supported the University’s conclusion, includ-
ing the “consistent stagnation in terms of the percentage of minority 
students enrolling at the University from 1996 to 2002.”68  Less than a 
quarter of the courses with five or more students at the University in-
cluded more than one African American student.69  Minority students 
admitted under the race-neutral approaches reported feeling isolated 
and lonely.70  The Court acknowledged the careful assessment that the 
University had undertaken and agreed that the University could rea-
sonably conclude that it had not attained diversity’s benefits.71 
The Court also dismissed the argument that the consideration of 
race had only a limited impact on diversity, reasoning that after the 
University adopted race-conscious holistic review, enrollment of  
Hispanics increased by fifty-four percent and enrollment of African 
Americans increased by ninety-four percent.72  The Court also rejected 
the suggestion that race-neutral alternatives were available to the  
University given that the University had employed such approaches 
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for seven years and had found that they did not achieve the benefits of 
diversity.73 
Justices Thomas and Alito dissented.  Justice Thomas would have 
overruled Grutter and found that the University’s consideration of race 
is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.74  Justice Alito wrote a 
lengthy dissent, which Justice Thomas joined, criticizing the  
University for failing to articulate its goals with sufficient clarity to 
enable the Court to determine whether the goals had been met and for 
being unable to prove how the Top Ten Percent Plan did not achieve 
its goals.75  He opined that the University could have achieved diversi-
ty’s educational benefits through such race-neutral alternatives as in-
creasing the number of students that are admitted through the Top 
Ten Percent Plan beyond seventy-five percent of the entering class, in-
creasing the emphasis on socioeconomic factors, and employing addi-
tional outreach measures.76  Justice Alito contended that given the 
demanding evidence required to satisfy strict scrutiny, the case should 
have been remanded for additional fact finding on what occurred dur-
ing the three years of admissions when the University returned to con-
sidering race within its holistic review and what diversity goals were 
not met by the admission of significant numbers of minority students 
under the Top Ten Percent Plan.77 
B.  How Fisher II Helps Institutions that Choose to Employ 
Affirmative Action 
Fisher II provides assistance to institutions that must defend af-
firmative action in admissions policies.  Like Fisher I, Fisher II reaf-
firmed that diversity’s educational benefits can serve as a compelling 
government interest.78  Fisher II clarified that diversity is not “a goal 
that can or should be reduced to pure numbers.”79  Therefore, univer-
sities are not required to establish numerical goals for their affirmative 
action plans given the risk of such numbers being labeled quotas.80  
Instead, the Court appears willing to accept such benefits of diversity 
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as creating a diverse cadre of leaders, increasing understanding among 
the races, reducing stereotypes, and preparing students to enter a di-
verse workforce as goals that are sufficiently concrete.81  This clarifica-
tion in Fisher II will enable universities to avoid what I previously 
identified as the Scylla of inadequate evidence on the racial composi-
tion they need to achieve diversity and the Charybdis of significant 
specificity on this issue that the program is labeled an unconstitutional 
quota.82 
Fisher II also lays bare the deficiencies of percentage plans.   
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the multiple flaws inherent to these 
plans.  He noted that percentage plans rely on a single measure that 
can prevent universities from considering the broad array of factors 
that diversity seeks, thereby echoing Grutter’s acknowledgment of this 
same shortcoming.83  Justice Kennedy also recognized that such plans 
aim to increase minority enrollment by admitting the top graduates 
from racially isolated high schools.84  Given this explicit racial aim, in-
creasing reliance on the Top Ten Percent Plan would not have made 
the University’s admissions policy “more race neutral.”85  He high-
lighted that such plans create “perverse incentives” for students by dis-
couraging them from selecting challenging classes or a more competi-
tive school.86  In addition, Fisher II’s rejection of the contention that 
the University should increase its admittees from the Top Ten Percent 
Plan reaffirms Grutter’s instruction that universities and colleges are 
not required to choose a race-neutral alternative that sacrifices assem-
bling a class with a broad range of characteristics solely to achieve di-
versity.87  Justice Kennedy’s thorough exploration of the shortcomings 
of percentage plans suggests that future litigants will not succeed by 
pointing to such plans as viable race-neutral alternatives. 
Fisher II did not mention the need for a termination point for af-
firmative action.  Instead, it emphasized that the University should 
regularly evaluate its admissions policy in light of its ongoing data col-
lection on the need for affirmative action.88  The Court’s silence in 
Fisher II about any durational limits on affirmative action, rather 
than reaffirming the importance of a termination point or Grutter’s 
2028 endpoint, may allow institutions to employ affirmative action be-
yond the 2028 deadline as long as they are engaging in periodic review. 
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Most importantly, Fisher II provides much-needed guidance on the 
types of evidence that colleges and universities will need to present in 
court to survive a constitutional challenge given the minimal guidance 
in Grutter.89  For instance, the Court in Fisher II reviewed a thorough 
record on the inefficacy of some race-neutral efforts, such as outreach 
and scholarship programs.90  Although each university will likely need 
to establish that it either attempted such efforts or carefully studied 
their potential impact and determined that they would be ineffective at 
enhancing diversity, the Court may be more likely to conclude that 
such efforts are ineffective after Fisher II.  In addition, Fisher II af-
firmed that university officials should carefully gather a wide variety 
of data and evidence about why affirmative action is necessary at their 
schools.91  This could include data on the aspects of diversity that 
race-neutral approaches are not yielding, evidence from faculty on the 
impact of a lack of diversity in their classes, and surveys and inter-
views with minority students about their experiences on campus in 
both diverse and nondiverse settings.  
Universities also must be prepared to provide data establishing that 
their affirmative action programs have a significant effect on admitted 
and enrolled students, given that the Court in Fisher II considered it 
important that the University of Texas at Austin’s data showed a sub-
stantial increase in African American and Hispanic enrollment after 
the University returned to considering race within its admissions pro-
cess.92  This contrasts with the Court’s decision to strike down the af-
firmative action plans in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 193 in part because the school districts 
could not show that the consideration of race had a significant effect.94  
By clearly establishing the evidence that universities must present to 
successfully defend the constitutionality of their race-conscious admis-
sions programs, Fisher II offers an instructive roadmap for university 
officials. 
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C.  Fisher II’s Cautionary Tale for Affirmative Action 
Despite these potential benefits, however, Fisher II also erected 
new hurdles.  Fisher II increased the evidentiary burdens for universi-
ties and colleges to prove the interrelated requirements that the con-
sideration of race is necessary and that they faithfully assessed work-
able race-neutral alternatives beyond the standard required in Grutter.  
To understand the heightened evidentiary standard that Fisher II im-
posed, one first has to understand the Court’s standard in Grutter.   
Grutter determined that the University of Michigan Law School 
(the “Law School”) satisfied the requirement that considering race was 
necessary to secure diversity’s benefits.  The Court noted that “[t]he 
Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that 
a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further 
its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body.”95  This statement reflects the Court’s deference to the 
Law School’s “experience and expertise” that diversity serves as an es-
sential means for the Law School to accomplish its mission.96  The 
Court then acknowledged that it was calibrating its narrow tailoring 
analysis to the context of university admissions programs by taking ac-
count of differences in such programs from other types of affirmative 
action programs.97  The defensible rejections of a lottery system, the 
percentage plans used by undergraduate institutions in several states, 
and a reduction in reliance on the LSAT and grades supported the 
Court’s conclusion that the consideration of race was necessary for the 
Law School.98  The Court also was satisfied that a university’s period-
ic review of its admissions process would help it continue to assess the 
necessity of considering race, given Grutter’s requirement that a race-
conscious admissions policy must include a reasonable limit on the du-
ration of the policy.99 
The Court’s analysis explicitly extended some deference to the Law 
School on the necessity requirement.  This deference is evidenced by 
the Court’s statement that “[w]e take the Law School at its word that 
it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions 
formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as 
soon as practicable.”100  The Court’s statement suggests a degree of 
trust in the Law School’s assertions that diversity could not be accom-
plished by any other means and that the Law School would end af-
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firmative action as soon as it could assemble a diverse class without its 
race-conscious admissions program. 
Grutter similarly did not hold the Law School to a demanding 
standard when it concluded that the Law School had given sufficient 
consideration to race-neutral alternatives.  Instead, the Court agreed 
with the Law School’s reasons for rejecting three other approaches.  
The Court’s opinion confirmed that a lottery approach and a reduction 
in the weight given to grades and LSAT scores would lead to a sub-
stantial reduction in diversity, the academic qualifications of the enter-
ing class, or both.101  The Court also acknowledged that the percent-
age plans used in Texas, Florida, and California would prevent the 
Law School from individually assessing each applicant in ways that 
would enable it to enroll students with a broad range of diverse quali-
ties.102  The Court additionally questioned whether a percentage plan 
would work for a professional school, such as the Law School, or for 
other graduate programs.103 
Grutter did not explain why the rejection of these race-neutral al-
ternatives established that the Law School had given adequate consid-
eration to race-neutral alternatives, nor what would be required for 
proving good faith consideration in the future.104  For instance, al-
though Grutter noted that the Law School should learn from the ap-
proaches used in states that have banned affirmative action, Grutter 
did not describe those approaches, other than percentage plans, and 
did not explain why those approaches, with the exception of percent-
age plans, would have been ineffective means for the Law School to 
enroll a diverse class.105 
The Court’s deference to the Law School is further evident in the 
Court’s statement that a university must prove “serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve 
the diversity the university seeks.”106  This formulation of the standard 
acknowledges that the Court offered credence — rather than skepti-
cism — to the Law School’s testimony in this regard.  In addition, by 
taking the Law School “at its word” that it would like to switch to 
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race-neutral alternatives, the Court showed great confidence in the 
Law School’s ability to police itself, even though the narrow tailoring 
analysis is supposed to accomplish a strict judicial policing of the use 
of race.107 
Perhaps Grutter’s approach to race-neutral alternatives is best ex-
plained by its instruction that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require  
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”108  Alterna-
tively, this approach might be explained by the fact that the Court 
seemed to attribute some good faith to the Law School when it as-
sessed the viability of race-neutral alternatives.109  Whatever the rea-
son, this approach raised the question of how much good faith consid-
eration of race-neutral alternatives was enough to satisfy the Court.  
Grutter’s failure to clarify what evidence was needed to show good 
faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives led some scholars to 
speculate about the types of evidence that institutions should gather to 
satisfy this requirement.110 
The Court in Fisher I moved away from this deferential approach, 
and in Fisher II applied a more demanding evidentiary analysis than 
that of Grutter.  In Fisher I, the Court remanded after rejecting the 
Fifth Circuit’s deference to the University in the narrow tailoring 
analysis.111  Scholars noted that this represented a significant shift in 
the Court’s approach to affirmative action.112  Instead of deferring to 
institutions on the narrow tailoring inquiry, Fisher I installed the 
courts as the final arbiters of this inquiry.113 
Fisher I also raised the evidentiary bar on the consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives.  Fisher I held that a “court must ultimately 
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be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce 
the educational benefits of diversity.”114  As several scholars noted, this 
formulation shifted away from Grutter’s good faith assessment of race-
neutral alternatives and trust in institutions in undertaking this in-
quiry, and instead replaced this approach with an exhaustion require-
ment that increased the difficulty of defending affirmative action.115 
Fisher II applies this searching inquiry to the evidence that the 
University presented to prove necessity and to show the absence of 
available race-neutral alternatives.  The University actually imple-
mented race-neutral approaches for seven years.116  It presented vari-
ous types of evidence to show that it had not achieved diversity’s bene-
fits during this time.  It conducted a year-long review to assess this 
issue.117  The University engaged in “months of study and deliberation, 
including retreats, interviews, [and] review of data.”118  The Court not-
ed that the University experienced ongoing stagnation in the enroll-
ment of minorities when it employed a race-neutral approach.119  This 
stagnation undermined the University’s capacity to include a diversity 
of perspectives within each entering class.120  The University also pro-
vided evidence that minority students admitted using race-neutral ho-
listic review reported significant isolation and loneliness.121  Further-
more, a study of small classes at the University found that “only 21 
percent of undergraduate classes with five or more students in them 
had more than one African-American student enrolled.  Twelve  
percent of these classes had no Hispanic students, as compared to 10 
percent in 1996.”122  The Court found that the University had con-
ducted a careful assessment of whether it was achieving diversity and 
had reasonably concluded that considering race was necessary to 
achieve diversity.123 
If this is the new evidentiary threshold to establish the necessity of 
affirmative action, Fisher II sets a high bar in several ways.  First, in 
addition to reaffirming the Fisher I pronouncement that no deference 
is applied within the narrowly tailored analysis, the Court in Fisher II 
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reviewed data over the seven years in which affirmative action was 
suspended.124  Seven years provided a substantial period of time for 
the University to assess the impact of its race-neutral efforts.  When 
these efforts did not yield diversity’s educational benefits, the  
University possessed significantly stronger evidence that it must con-
sider race than a university would have based on hypothetical assess-
ments of what might happen if an institution did not consider race.  
For instance, the Court noted the substantial increase in the percent-
age of Hispanics and African Americans admitted through holistic re-
view once race was considered, with Hispanics showing a fifty-four 
percent increase and African Americans showing a ninety-four percent 
increase.125  These increases established that considering an applicant’s 
race had a “meaningful, if still limited,” impact on the diversity of the 
University.126  Although the University of Michigan Law School ad-
missions policy upheld in Grutter did not have evidence from several 
years of eliminating affirmative action, it is unclear whether evidence 
of the actual impact of race-neutral alternatives will become the effec-
tive gold standard.  Even if it does not, after Fisher II what evidence 
will be sufficiently persuasive to prove that the use of race is necessary 
when multiple race-neutral alternatives have not been implemented 
and proven unsuccessful? 
Second, the University presented multiple types of data and re-
search to support its conclusion that it needed to consider race.  Even 
if the Court had rejected one or two types of evidence — such as the 
study of small classes or student interviews — the Court still had sub-
stantial evidence from demographic data and retreats to support its 
judgment.  This suggests the wide array of evidence that the Court 
will likely expect from future litigants.  For instance, the University 
provided a “39-page proposal” to support its return to affirmative ac-
tion after its year-long study.127  The Court’s inclusion of the page 
length of this report suggests that the Court found the proposal’s 
length probative of the thorough and careful nature of its analysis.128 
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Third, Fisher II also provides a careful record of the many race-
neutral alternatives that the University actually implemented that 
proved ineffective.  For instance, the University increased its recruiting 
of minority students and its budget for such efforts.  It held more than 
1000 events to recruit students.129  The University also established 
three new scholarships that were aimed at diversifying the student 
body.130  It created regional centers to assist with admissions.131  These 
efforts demonstrate a substantial commitment of resources, personnel, 
and finances to admitting a diverse student body. 
Justice Kennedy’s review of the race-neutral alternatives in Fisher 
II suggests that the Court will be looking for far more extensive efforts 
from future universities and colleges than the efforts that it accepted 
from the Law School in Grutter.  Although Justice Kennedy acknowl-
edged Grutter’s statement that every race-neutral alternative did not 
have to be exhausted, he also noted that a university must demonstrate 
that “workable” and “available” race-neutral alternatives would not 
accomplish the benefits of diversity.132  It is unclear what evidence will 
be required of universities to prove this point, but Fisher II suggests 
that the Court will be expecting a considerable investment of a univer-
sity’s capital and staff to prove that potential race-neutral alternatives 
are not workable. 
It could be the case that, to satisfy the Court on this issue, a uni-
versity or college must first implement several race-neutral alternatives 
that ultimately prove ineffective to achieve diversity’s educational 
benefits, and carefully study how other approaches would impact di-
versity.  After Fisher II, institutions undoubtedly are admonished to 
match the University of Texas’s deep commitment to pursuing such al-
ternatives in ways that are feasible given the size and resources of each 
institution.  Institutions must also provide persuasive evidence of why 
these efforts did not yield the educational benefits of diversity. 
The fourth reason that Fisher II sets a high evidentiary bar is that 
the opinion acknowledged that race was a “‘factor of a factor of a fac-
tor’ in the holistic-review calculus” of the University’s admissions poli-
cy.133  However, in states where the consideration of race has not been 
banned, universities may be employing an approach much closer to the 
admissions plan upheld in Grutter and the Harvard University ap-
proach that considered race as one factor among many factors, as dis-
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cussed approvingly in Bakke.134  Because the University of Texas at 
Austin considered race as a factor within an admissions factor in a 
multifactored process, Fisher II raises the possibility that the Court 
could strike down a plan if a university affords race a significantly 
greater weight than the University of Texas at Austin did such that 
race influences substantially more admissions decisions.  A harbinger 
of this approach can be found in the Court’s comment that “[t]he fact 
that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion of admis-
sions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence 
of unconstitutionality.”135  This new hallmark may serve as a stum-
bling block to institutions that consider race throughout the admissions 
process. 
Finally, the Court repeatedly noted that the University must con-
tinually gather and assess additional data and information, and tailor 
its admissions approach in response to this evidence.136  For example, 
the Court’s opinion undoubtedly envisions the University gathering in-
formation in the future on the types of diversity that the University is 
able to accomplish through the Top Ten Percent Plan as compared to 
the race-conscious holistic review.  This evidence was not demanded in 
Fisher II because Ms. Fisher did not challenge the Top Ten Percent 
Plan.137  This suggests that despite the broad array of evidence provid-
ed in Fisher II, that same evidence may not be sufficient in a future 
case challenging the totality of the University’s admissions policy. 
Fisher II suggests that the warm reception that the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions plan received in Grutter has likely 
ended.  In its place, Fisher II offers a cautionary tale of the Court’s 
plans to implement a closer and more demanding scrutiny of evidence 
and statistical data regarding the necessity to consider an applicant’s 
race and the absence of viable race-neutral alternatives.  Fisher II’s 
insistence on such thorough data and research on these issues may 
chill the use of affirmative action on campuses that want to avoid the 
risks of litigation or the costs of preparing a potential defense.138  If 
Fisher II has such a chilling effect, it will contribute to the eventual 
demise of affirmative action on some college campuses. 
In the short term, Fisher I and II may make it more difficult for 
institutions to defend affirmative action.  Moreover, even if Fisher II 
ultimately guides institutions on how to satisfy strict scrutiny — as I 
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hope it does — rather than serves as a cautionary tale, the regular 
shifts in the Court’s composition along with its jurisprudence that re-
quires an eventual endpoint for affirmative action ultimately will lead 
to the demise of affirmative action.  Given this reality, the United 
States should adopt comprehensive and far-reaching reforms to reme-
dy the educational opportunity disparities that cause the achievement 
gaps that lead some institutions to rely on affirmative action.  The next 
Part explores the nature of these gaps and proposes an approach for 
institutions to explicitly acknowledge opportunity gaps in admissions 
in ways that may enhance diversity. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY GAPS  
AND HOW THEY CAN SERVE AS RACE-NEUTRAL  
FACTORS THAT MAY ENHANCE DIVERSITY 
Educational opportunities within the United States are not distrib-
uted equally, rationally, or fairly.  Instead, zip codes, socioeconomic 
status, race, and geography often define whether a child receives a 
world-class education or a substandard one.139  Opportunity gaps leave 
many students behind as the economy moves away from low-skill jobs 
and toward jobs that require higher-order thinking.140  In addition, the 
United States pays a high cost for the low-quality education that it 
provides to many children.  These costs often take the form of higher 
health care spending, lost income and tax revenues, increased housing 
and welfare assistance, greater crime, and less civic participation,141 as 
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OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 1 (2010); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, How Reconstruct-
ing Education Federalism Could Fulfill the Aims of Rodriguez, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF 
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 203, 212–13; Welner & Carter, supra note 19, at 1, 4–5.  
 140 See Thomas Bailey, Implications of Educational Inequality in a Global Economy, in THE 
PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 
74, 78–79, 92–93 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE PRICE WE 
PAY]. 
 141 Robinson, supra note 18, at 974 (citing Enrico Moretti, Crime and the Costs of Criminal Jus-
tice, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 140, at 142, 157; Peter Muennig, Consequences in Health 
Status and Costs, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 140, at 125, 137; Cecilia Elena Rouse, Con-
sequences for the Labor Market, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 140, at 99, 101; Jane 
Waldfogel et al., Welfare and the Costs of Public Assistance, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 
140, at 160, 173).  I have also explored these costs elsewhere.  See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, No 
Quick Fix for Equity and Excellence: The Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education Federalism, 
27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 22–24) (citing, for example, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., NONVOTERS: WHO THEY ARE, WHAT THEY THINK 2 (2012); Randi 
Hjalmarsson, Helena Holmlund & Matthew J. Lindquist, The Effect of Education on Criminal 
Convictions and Incarceration: Causal Evidence from Micro-Data, 125 ECON. J. 1290, 1325 
(2015); Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison 
Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 183 (2004); Enrico Moretti, Workers’ 
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well as a failure to prepare students adequately for military service142 
and to protect our security interests.143 
Before the Court declares that the time for affirmative action has 
come to an end, the United States must first close the educational op-
portunity gaps and the resulting achievement gaps that lead many in-
stitutions to rely on affirmative action.  Achieving these goals should 
enhance the ability of institutions to achieve diverse student bodies 
without affirmative action.  In addition, using the achievement of the-
se goals as the predicate for dismantling affirmative action would also 
prevent the Court from choosing an arbitrary end date that willfully 
ignores the underlying educational disparities and challenges that lead 
institutions to turn to affirmative action. 
In this Part, I describe some of the disparities in educational oppor-
tunity and achievement in the United States with an emphasis on ra-
cial disparities.  I then explain how postsecondary institutions could 
consider the nature of an applicant’s educational disadvantage as a 
positive admissions factor that may enhance diversity. 
A.  Educational Opportunity and Achievement Gaps 
Racial minorities more often experience a wide range of disad-
vantages within schools.  These disadvantages are evident in the 
teacher quality that many minority students receive.  Latino and Afri-
can American students are approximately twice as likely as their white 
or Asian peers to attend schools with over twenty percent of the teach-
ers in their first year of teaching,144 and students attending schools 
with high concentrations of minority students are twice as likely to be 
assigned to new teachers.145  Indeed, “[b]y every measure of qualifica-
tions — certification, subject-matter background, pedagogical training, 
selectivity of college attended, test scores, or experience — less-
qualified teachers are found in schools serving greater numbers of  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Education, Spillovers, and Productivity: Evidence from Plant-Level Production Functions, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 656, 683 (2004)). 
 142 Gerard Robinson, The Closing of the Military Mind?, AEIDEAS (Feb. 24, 2016, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/the-closing-of-the-military-mind [https://perma.cc/LS46-26AS] (cit-
ing CHRISTINA THEOKAS, EDUC. TR., SHUT OUT OF THE MILITARY: TODAY’S HIGH 
SCHOOL EDUCATION DOESN’T MEAN THAT YOU’RE READY FOR TODAY’S ARMY 1 (2010)). 
 143 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. EDUCATION REFORM AND NATIONAL SE-
CURITY 7 (2012) (“The Task Force members believe America’s educational failures pose five dis-
tinct threats to national security: threats to economic growth and competitiveness, U.S. physical 
safety, intellectual property, U.S. global awareness, and U.S. unity and cohesion.”). 
 144 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 2013–2014 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA 
COLLECTION: A FIRST LOOK 9 (2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14 
-first-look.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XYJ-K5Q3]. 
 145 HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, EDUC. TR., TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW 
POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER QUALITY 2 (2006). 
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low-income and minority students.”146  These disparities in teacher 
quality adversely affect the achievement of minority and low-income  
students.147 
Minority students also typically experience greater access to voca-
tional and remedial courses and less access to challenging academic 
classes, rigorous curricula, and courses that prepare students for col-
lege.148  Remedial courses often are geared toward lower-level cogni-
tive skills and prepare students for low-status jobs, while more rigor-
ous curricula yield higher-order skills and prepare students with the 
skills that the “global knowledge economy”149 demands.150  Although 
there has been a significant increase in the number of African Ameri-
can and Hispanic students taking at least one AP exam,151 African 
American and American Indian students are more likely to attend high 
schools without a complete AP program, with complete defined as of-
fering at least one AP class in science, mathematics, social science, and 
English.152  In addition, the College Board, which administers AP Ex-
ams, found that African American students who graduated in 2013 
were “the most underrepresented group in AP classrooms and in the 
population of successful AP Exam takers.”153  Only 57% of African 
American students and 67% of Hispanic students enjoy access to the 
complete range of science and math courses offered, while 81% of 
Asian students and 71% of white students enjoy such access.154  More 
college counseling is provided to students in rigorous courses, such as 
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 146 LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S 
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 43 (2010). 
 147 See id. 
 148 Id. at 52, 57–59 (noting that minority students enjoy less access to honors, gifted and talent-
ed, and advanced placement courses while they experience overrepresentation in special education 
courses); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 144, at 6–7; Lynne 
Bland & Anne Neve, Equity and Access for Minority Students in AP Courses, 5 J. CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY PERSP. IN EDUC. 21, 22–23 (2012).  
 149 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 52, 54, 56–57 (quoting TONY WAGNER, 
THE GLOBAL ACHIEVEMENT GAP: WHY EVEN OUR BEST SCHOOLS DON’T TEACH THE 
NEW SURVIVAL SKILLS OUR CHILDREN NEED — AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 8 
(2008) (emphasis omitted)). 
 150 See id. at 52, 54, 56–57. 
 151 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN 
THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 76 (2010). 
 152 EDUC. TR., FINDING AMERICA’S MISSING AP AND IB STUDENTS 4 (2013).  
 153 COLL. BD., THE 10TH ANNUAL AP REPORT TO THE NATION 30 (2014), http://media 
. c o l l e g e b o a r d . c o m / d i g i t a l S e r v i c e s / p d f / a p / r t n / 1 0 t h - a n n u a l / 1 0 t h - a n n u a l - a p - r e p o r t - t o - t h e - n a t i o n 
-single-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PTD-5JJE]. 
 154 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: 
DATA SNAPSHOT (COLLEGE AND CAREER READINESS), ISSUE BRIEF NO. 3, at 8 (2014),  
h t t p : / / o c r d a t a . e d . g o v / D o w n l o a d s / C R D C - C o l l e g e - a n d - C a r e e r - R e a d i n e s s - S n a p s h o t . p d f  [h t t p s : / / 
perma.cc/X9K2-3274].  The full range of math and science courses are Algebra I, Geometry,  
Algebra II, Calculus, Biology, Chemistry, and Physics.  Id. 
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students in honors, AP, or college preparatory courses.155  Given the 
weighting of advanced courses and the complexities of the college ap-
plication process, these disparities hinder the application and entrance 
of minority students into colleges and universities. 
Minority students also experience higher rates of suspension and 
expulsion, as well as more exposure to safety concerns in their schools, 
such as gangs and weapons.  Although 42.8% of African American 
students and 21.9% of Hispanic students have been suspended, only 
15.6% of white students have been suspended.156  Even though only 
1% of white students have been expelled, 12.8% of African American 
students have been expelled.157  African American and Hispanic stu-
dents are more than twice as likely to attend a school where gangs are 
present, with 37.6% of African American and 36.1% of Hispanic stu-
dents attending such schools compared to 16% of white students.158  
African American and Hispanic students are more likely to be threat-
ened or injured with a weapon in school than white students are.159  
These discipline and safety factors create more difficult learning envi-
ronments for many African American and Hispanic students in ways 
that can adversely influence their focus on academic achievement. 
Nationally, districts that educate the most minority students receive 
approximately $2000 less per pupil than districts that serve the fewest 
minority students.160  However, funding disparities vary significantly 
between states, with eighteen states providing significantly less fund-
ing to districts that serve the most minority students while fourteen 
states provide more money to districts that serve the most minority 
students.161  A research consensus has emerged that money matters  
for education because of the influential resources that it can pur-
chase,162 and the longstanding debate over whether money matters has 
shifted to how money should be spent most efficiently to improve stu-
dent achievement.163  In addition, research by Professors C. Kirabo  
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 155 Andrea Venezia & Michael W. Kirst, Inequitable Opportunities: How Current Education 
Systems and Policies Undermine the Chances for Student Persistence and Success in College, 19 
EDUC. POL’Y 283, 293 (2005). 
 156 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 93. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 115. 
 159 Id. at 114. 
 160 NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO 
MANY STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 8 
(2015); see also RAEGEN MILLER & DIANA EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THERE 
STILL BE DRAGONS: RACIAL DISPARITY IN SCHOOL FUNDING 3 (2011) (“Meaningful levels 
of racial disparity clearly exist in the provision of school funds in some states.”). 
 161 See USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 160, at 8.  
 162 See BRUCE D. BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT AGE-OLD QUES-
TION: DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION?, at iv-v (2012). 
 163 Ogletree & Robinson, supra note 18, at 267. 
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Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico reveals that increas-
es in funding can result in significant increases in education and earn-
ings as well as reductions in adult poverty.164  Furthermore, minority 
students make up a disproportionate share of many large school dis-
tricts that experience limited access to textbooks, overcrowding, and 
poorly maintained facilities.165 
High-poverty learning environments also provide additional disad-
vantages for a disproportionate number of minority students.  Only 
7.64% of white students attended high-poverty schools in 2014, while 
42.62% of minority students attended such schools.166  High-poverty 
learning environments consistently perform worse than other schools 
and often lack effective teachers, adequate resources, appropriate class 
sizes, and motivated and engaged parents, as well as other factors that 
improve student achievement.167  Such environments also are affected 
by a host of out-of-school challenges such as higher crime rates, inade-
quate healthcare, greater mobility, and more instability within the 
home.168  High-poverty schools exert a negative influence on student 
achievement independent of a student’s socioeconomic status.169   
These educational opportunity gaps play a substantial role in creating 
and sustaining the racial achievement gap.170  While some students are 
educated in schools that far surpass state learning standards, others 
are relegated to opportunities that emphasize the basics and teaching 
to the test.171  These disparities in opportunity will lead many white 
and affluent students to higher-order thinking skills while many poor 
and minority students are left to basic, rote thinking and test prepara-
tion.172  Leading education scholar Professor Linda Darling-Hammond 
summarizes the connection well, noting that “when the evidence is ex-
amined, it is clear that educational outcomes for these [minority] stu-
dents are at least as much a function of their unequal access to key ed-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 164 C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson & Claudia Persico, The Effects of School Spending 
on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms, 131 Q.J. 
ECON. 157, 160 (2016). 
 165 Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take to Close the 
Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 19, at 77, 83–84. 
 166 Indicators: School Poverty, NAT’L EQUITY ATLAS, http://nationalequityatlas.org 
/indicators/school_poverty [https://perma.cc/9TZZ-93CU]. 
 167 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 37; RYAN, supra note 139, at 277–78; Darling-
Hammond, supra note 165, at 77, 82; GARY ORFIELD ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 
E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 
26–27 (2012). 
 168 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 37; RYAN, supra note 139, at 158. 
 169 Darling-Hammond, supra note 165, at 82–83. 
 170 Welner & Carter, supra note 19, at 1–3. 
 171 See RYAN, supra note 139, at 259. 
 172 See id. at 260. 
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ucational resources, both inside and outside of school, as they are a 
function of race, class, or culture.”173 
Most selective institutions continue to rely on the standardized SAT 
or ACT.174  On the SAT, a substantial racial gap exists in all three sub-
ject areas.175  More importantly, the size of the SAT achievement gap 
has remained relatively stable from 1986–1987 to 2013–2014.176  On 
the ACT, a far lower percentage of African American and Hispanic 
students met the ACT college readiness benchmark, as compared to 
white or Asian students on math, science, English, and reading.177  
The test score gap on the ACT also has remained relatively stable for 
the last decade.178  College entrance exam disparities are unsurprising 
given the persistence of the gap in elementary and secondary achieve-
ment scores.179  Overall, African American and Latino applicants face  
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 173 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 30; see also John B. Diamond, Still Separate and 
Unequal: Examining Race, Opportunity, and School Achievement in “Integrated” Suburbs, 75 J. 
NEGRO EDUC. 495, 497 (2006) (“The educational experiences of African Americans are tied to 
the structural, institutional, and symbolic consequences of being African American in the U.S.  It 
is the cumulative weight of these forces that combine to shape (and at times, undermine) African 
American opportunity and achievement.”).  
 174 Jonathan P. Epstein, Behind the SAT-Optional Movement: Context and Controversy, J.C. 
ADMISSION, Summer 2009, at 8, 9. 
 175 For the 2013–2014 school year, on average, whites scored 534 on the math section, Asians 
and Pacific Islanders scored 598, African Americans scored 429 and non–Mexican American His-
panics scored 459.  On critical reading, whites scored 529, Asians and Pacific Islanders scored 523, 
while African Americans scored 431 and non–Mexican American Hispanics scored 451.  On writ-
ing, whites scored 513, Asians and Pacific Islanders scored 530, African Americans scored 418, 
and non–Mexican American Hispanics scored 443.  THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2014, at 
301 (2016).  Beginning with the SAT administrations in 2016, the College Board has designed the 
SAT to include three sections: evidence-based reading and writing, math, and an essay.  Press Re-
lease, The College Board, The College Board Announces Bold Plans to Expand Access to Oppor-
tunity; Redesign of the SAT (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.collegeboard.org/releases/2014/expand-
opportunity-redesign-sat [https://perma.cc/QF9H-H9HQ]. 
 176 See SNYDER ET AL., supra note 175, at 301.  
 177 Fourteen percent of African Americans and 29% of Hispanics met the ACT college readi-
ness benchmark in math, compared to 52% of whites and 69% of Asians.  For science, 12% of 
African Americans and 23% of Hispanics met the benchmark, compared to 48% of whites and 
57% of Asians.  In reading, 19% of African Americans and 31% of Hispanics met the benchmark, 
compared to 56% of whites and 57% of Asians.  In English, 34% of African Americans and 47% 
of Hispanics met the benchmark, compared to 75% of both whites and Asians.  NAT’L ACT, THE 
CONDITION OF COLLEGE & CAREER READINESS 2015, at 7 (2015). 
 178 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 85. 
 179 But see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAEP 2012: 
TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS: READING 1971–2012, MATH 1973–2012, at 16 (2013) (find-
ing that the racial achievement gap on the National Assessment of Educational Progress has nar-
rowed since the early 1970s). 
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many more hurdles to successful entrance to higher education than 
whites.180 
B.  Weighting Educational Disadvantage  
Within Selective Postsecondary Admissions 
Under the Court’s current jurisprudence, universities and colleges 
must consider race-neutral alternatives before resorting to affirmative 
action.181  One innovation I propose is that institutions should consider 
an applicant’s educational disadvantage as a positive admissions factor 
that may enhance diversity.182  At a minimum, considering this ap-
proach will help institutions respond to the Court’s insistence that they 
prove that no viable alternative to affirmative action exists.183  In ad-
dition, if such an approach assists an institution in reducing their reli-
ance on race, an institution could demonstrate that it is relying on race 
as little as possible.184  Furthermore, the Court’s prior pronouncements 
on the limited-duration requirement admonish selective postsecondary 
institutions to prepare for the day when the Court declares that  
the time has come for affirmative action to end.185  Considering  
educational disadvantage can serve as one way to prepare for affirma-
tive action’s end.  Finally, this approach also enables institutions to 
mitigate the impact of disparities in educational opportunities for  
applicants. 
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 180 Eric Grodsky & Michal Kurlaender, The Demography of Higher Education in the Wake of 
Affirmative Action, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 33, 57 (Eric Grodsky & 
Michal Kurlaender eds., 2010).  Universities and colleges also could independently consider the 
racial isolation of high schools.  Research reveals that racially isolated schools oftentimes provide 
inferior educational experiences and produce inferior results, and thus universities and colleges 
could consider the racial isolation of a high school as one type of disadvantage.  See, e.g.,  NAT’L 
ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 18 (Robert L. Linn & Kevin 
G. Welner eds., 2007); Jomills Henry Braddock II & Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects of School 
Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828, 828 
(James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 2004); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects 
on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741–42 (1998); Amy Stuart 
Wells & Erica Frankenberg, The Public Schools and the Challenge of the Supreme Court’s Integra-
tion Decision, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 178, 180–83 (2007).  However, although the racial isolation 
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that considering the race of the applicant’s high school is sufficiently tied to an applicant’s race 
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factor. 
 181 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
 182 During oral argument in Fisher II, counsel for Fisher suggested, without elaboration, that 
institutions should consider educational disadvantage.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
14, at 28–29. 
 183 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 184 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 185 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003). 
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1.  How to Weight Educational Disadvantage in Postsecondary 
Admissions. — Currently, selective colleges and universities consider a 
broad array of factors when admitting a class.  Academic preparedness 
serves as a key credential.186  Most institutions consider grade point 
average (GPA) more heavily than the other factors in a student’s rec-
ord, and admissions officers rely on the courses that a student took to 
contextualize the GPA.187  Class rank also typically informs the con-
sideration of GPA because it helps institutions understand a high 
school’s grading policy.188  Class rank is evaluated in light of the num-
ber of students within the high school class as well as the quality of 
the high school that a student attends.189  The SAT and ACT also pro-
vide critical information for most institutions on college prepared-
ness,190 although some, including Justice Alito in his Fisher II dissent, 
criticize consideration of these scores because of their adverse impact 
on minority students.191  Leadership experience and potential also are 
desirable qualities for most selective colleges and universities.192  Addi-
tional factors that selective institutions consider include personal es-
says, past employment, extracurricular participation, family income 
and background, geographic location, civic engagement, awards, and 
honors, as well as recommendation letters from teachers.193  Many in-
stitutions also consider an applicant favorably if a parent or other rela-
tive attended the institution.194 
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 186 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 23–24. 
 187 ROBERT J. STERNBERG, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 35, 40 
(2010).  
 188 Id. at 39.  
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. at 44.  
 191 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2233–34, 2234 n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also JAMILLAH 
MOORE, RACE AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 19 (2005) 
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 193 Id. at 25; MOORE, supra note 191, at 16. 
 194 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 24; MOORE, supra note 191, at 164.  The consideration of 
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See generally AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (presenting critiques of admissions policies that 
benefit alumni); MOORE, supra note 191, at 164 (noting that the limited number of minority 
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Colleges and universities consider the quality of an applicant’s high 
school based on information that is typically submitted by a counselor 
that provides a profile for the high school.195  This profile may include 
the geographic and demographic makeup of the school, the curriculum 
and course offerings, an explanation of the grading scale, how enroll-
ment in advanced coursework is determined, average standardized test 
scores, the colleges and universities prior graduates attended, and 
awards and honors earned by students.196  In addition, high schools al-
so may submit information such as teacher credentials, pupil-teacher 
ratio, and the extracurricular activities provided.197  An institution also 
can choose to create a profile for a high school as an aid in university 
admissions.198 
Some admissions practices consider the quality of an applicant’s 
high school as information that provides context for a student’s appli-
cation, such as a student’s class rank and GPA.199  In addition to the 
profiles submitted, admissions officers also may possess informal 
knowledge of the quality of high schools, sometimes gathered from 
brief visits to high schools or prior applications from the high 
school.200  This information may or may not accurately capture the in-
tellectual rigor of the students and the caliber of the high school.201  
This information may lead an admissions officer to explicitly or sub-
consciously increase the GPA from a well-regarded school or discount 
a GPA from an unknown or disfavored school.202 
A survey of college admissions officers regarding how admissions 
officers assess a variety of student characteristics indicates that the 
quality of an applicant’s high school sometimes — but not consistent-
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alumni from elite institutions results in very few minority students being able to take advantage 
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 200 LAIRD, supra note 198, at 237. 
 201 See id. at 231, 237. 
 202 STERNBERG, supra note 187, at 38. 
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ly — provides context for assessment of an applicant.203  The results 
reveal that 38.9% of colleges give no consideration to the applicant’s 
high school and 33.7% view it as having only limited importance.204  
Only a small percentage — 3.3% — view an applicant’s high school as 
a factor of considerable importance and 24.1% view it as a factor of 
moderate importance.205  Interestingly enough, the survey of factors 
that colleges consider most important for admission does not include 
an applicant’s high school as an admissions factor.206  Instead, it iden-
tifies sixteen factors that focus on grades and standardized test scores, 
recommendations, extracurricular activities, and an interview.207  This 
data, as well as other research,208 suggests that high school quality 
sometimes is considered informally to provide context but is not typi-
cally considered as a weighty admissions factor by most institutions. 
As a race-neutral alternative to affirmative action, admissions of-
ficers could consider educational disadvantage as a positive factor in 
admissions.  For instance, attending a high-poverty school should be 
included as an indicator of educational disadvantage given the re-
search revealing the adverse effects of such schools.209  Institutions  
also could assign positive weight to limited access to advanced 
coursework, the quality and experience of teachers within a school, 
and high suspension rates as factors that likely hindered a student’s 
achievement and thus deserve positive weight within the admissions 
decision.  
Admissions officers could provide an admissions preference for ed-
ucational disadvantage in two ways.  First, the presence of educational 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 203 MELISSA CLINEDINST, NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, STATE OF 
COLLEGE ADMISSION 35 (2015). 
 204 Id.  
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 28. 
 207 The sixteen factors are grades in college prep courses, strength of curriculum, admission test 
scores (SAT, ACT), grades in all courses, essay or writing sample, student’s demonstrated interest, 
counselor recommendation, class rank, teacher recommendation, extracurricular activities, inter-
view, subject test scores (AP, IB), portfolio, SAT II scores, state graduation exam scores, and 
work.  See id.   
 208 See STERNBERG, supra note 187, at 36, 39 (explaining that the meaning of a student’s GPA 
and class rank can vary depending on the quality of the high school and the students in the 
school); Michal Kurlaender et al., Access and Diversity at the University of California in the Post–
Affirmative Action Era, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL EQUITY: CONSIDERING THE 
FISHER CASE TO FORGE THE PATH AHEAD 80, 86 (Uma M. Jayakumar et al. eds., 2015) (not-
ing that UC Berkeley assesses each applicant “in the specific context of his or her high school cir-
cumstances”); Roger E. Studley, Inequality, Student Achievement, and College Admissions: A 
Remedy for Underrepresentation 4 (Ctr. for Studies in Higher Educ.: Research & Occasional Pa-
per Series, CSHE.1.03, Feb. 2003), http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared 
/publications/docs/ROP.Studley.1.03.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2KM-PNN7] (stating that many col-
leges and universities “instruct application readers to evaluate each candidate with respect to his 
or her circumstance”). 
 209 See supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text. 
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disadvantage could expand the pool of students that are identified as 
academically qualified for admission.  For example, an applicant who 
performed well academically within the context of the opportunities 
that she was given and who took full advantage of available opportu-
nities could be considered qualified even though she did not take as 
many AP classes as her competitors because they were not offered at 
her school.  This might lead admissions officers to consider a wider ar-
ray of GPAs as acceptable given evidence that many students cannot 
earn the additional points that advanced placement classes provide.  
Second, once a student is determined to be qualified, if an applicant 
performed well within available opportunities, admissions officers also 
could consider educational disadvantage as a factor that supports an 
admissions advantage.210 
This proposal would benefit students of all races because all races 
experience a variety of forms of educational disadvantage.211  Howev-
er, this proposal also would particularly assist in increasing the admis-
sions opportunities of minority students because of the frequent  
convergence of race and inferior educational opportunities within the 
United States described above.212  Given that students of all races ex-
perience these disadvantages, this approach could not credibly be la-
beled a proxy for race.  But for some institutions, this approach may 
yield a significant number of admissions for minority students because 
minority students disproportionately experience these disadvantages.213 
To implement this proposal, universities and colleges would need to 
request three additional types of information.  First, institutions should 
include a question to high school counselors that asks them to describe 
the nature and scope of any educational disadvantages of the school.  
This question could be added to high school profiles.  Admissions 
counselors typically assess thousands of applications.  Such a question 
would prevent admissions officers from having to discern and calculate 
educational disadvantage from what is not offered by the high school 
or by the quality of what is provided.  In addition, high school counse-
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 210 This proposal provides a means to operationalize recognition of the adverse impact that ed-
ucational disadvantage can have on an applicant.  John T. Yun & José F. Moreno, College Access, 
K-12 Concentrated Disadvantage, and the Next 25 Years of Education Research, 35 EDUC. RE-
SEARCHER 12, 18 (2006).  This proposal also complements the recommendations that colleges 
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generation college student status as positive admissions criteria, Brown-Nagin, supra note 115, at 
498. 
 211 See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 139, at 12–14 (noting that students 
“who attend schools in high poverty neighborhoods are getting an education that more closely 
approximates school in developing nations,” id. at 12). 
 212 See supra section II.A, pp. 206–10.   
 213 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 36–37; Yun & Moreno, supra note 210, at 12.  
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lors would only need to provide this statement annually and it could 
be included in all student applications. 
Second, for an accurate assessment of educational disadvantage to 
occur, institutions should ask that additional information be included 
in high school profiles.  For instance, although some high school pro-
files include teacher credentials, the sample profile provided by the 
College Board does not include teacher credentials or experience.214  
Yet research reveals that teacher quality, including preparation for 
teaching, experience, certification status, and academic background, 
has a tremendous impact on student achievement.215  This information 
would help colleges assess who was taught by high-quality teachers 
and who may have been hindered by the quality of her or his instruc-
tion.  A description of the nature, quality, and access to instructional 
materials, such as technology, textbooks, library and classroom re-
sources, the pupil-to-counselor ratio, and the quality of the facilities 
would further enhance an effective assessment of the breadth of educa-
tional disadvantage that an applicant experienced.216 
Finally, colleges and universities should ask counselors to include a 
few sentences or a paragraph on how long an applicant has experi-
enced educational disadvantages and the disadvantages that the  
applicant personally experienced.  Is the applicant a student who expe-
rienced educational disadvantages throughout her education or one 
who only experienced them early or late in her education?  This can 
help admissions officers determine how much of a positive weight to 
assign to educational disadvantage. 
Some of the state universities that were forced to end the considera-
tion of race have adopted admissions reforms that are consistent with 
this proposal.217  The percentage plans in use in Texas, Florida, and 
California serve as powerful admissions advantages for educationally 
disadvantaged high schools by automatically admitting students from 
relatively low-quality high schools.218  The state university systems of 
California, Florida, and Washington also consider some aspects of ed-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 214 See Sample High School Profile, supra note 196.   
 215 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 43–44. 
 216 Cf. LAIRD, supra note 198, at 237–38 (recommending that colleges and universities create 
complete profiles of high schools from available data).  
 217 Many universities also target recruiting to disadvantaged high schools that typically have 
substantial minority enrollment.  Mark C. Long, Essay, Affirmative Action and Its Alternatives in 
Public Universities: What Do We Know?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 315, 319–20 (2007). 
 218 See id.  
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ucational disadvantage within their admissions practices.219  Other 
universities also may consider educational disadvantage.220 
For those universities and colleges that currently consider educa-
tional disadvantage, the additional information that would be gathered 
under my proposal would allow admissions officers to make a far more 
accurate assessment of educational disadvantage.  In addition, the dual 
consideration of educational disadvantage by admissions officers — 
once when deciding who is qualified and once as an admissions prefer-
ence of varying degree depending on the scope and duration of the ed-
ucational disadvantage — would serve as a more effective recognition 
of the breadth of educational disadvantage suffered by many students 
than is offered by universities that only consider educational disad-
vantage in one of these two ways.  Although this approach would im-
pose costs on high schools and postsecondary institutions, I demon-
strate in the next section how the benefits of this approach would out-
weigh its costs. 
2.  The Costs and Benefits of Weighting Educational Disad-
vantage. — Considering educational disadvantage as a positive admis-
sions factor would impose several costs for both secondary schools as 
well as postsecondary institutions.  For high schools, assessing educa-
tional disadvantage would increase the burden on high school counse-
lors to create the additional information needed to provide more de-
tailed profiles of high schools.  It also would take time for counselors 
to note on an individual basis how long students had experienced edu-
cational disadvantage and any specific noteworthy instances of disad-
vantage, such as a student being academically prepared to take an ad-
vanced course but unable to enroll due to it not being offered at the 
school.  Furthermore, if this approach were used robustly, it might be 
criticized for incentivizing parents to leave their children in low-
quality educational environments, just as the percent plans are criti-
cized for encouraging parents to keep their children in lower-
performing schools.221 
Postsecondary institutions also would bear substantial costs.  
Postsecondary institutions might choose to develop technology to gath-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 219 Id. at 319; Joni James, Governor Stands by One Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2002, at 
1A. 
 220 Studley, supra note 208, at 4.  Although Roger Studley, the Coordinator of Research and 
Evaluation for the UC Office of the President, states that many universities and colleges currently 
instruct admissions officers to consider socioeconomic factors by assessing an application in light 
of the applicant’s circumstances or giving additional points for a disadvantaged educational expe-
rience, id., the survey data of college admissions officers noted above indicates that this practice 
may not be as widespread as he suggests and instead may be more predominant within the UC 
system than outside of it, see supra notes 203–208 and accompanying text. 
 221 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 n.10 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
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er the additional information provided by secondary schools.  Such 
technology would require investments in the creation and maintenance 
of software and training in how to gather and present this information 
in the most useful format.  Admissions officers also would need ade-
quate time to assess the additional information to determine how much 
weight to give a student’s disadvantage.   
In addition, institutions would need to conduct assessments of 
whether this race-neutral alternative would enhance diversity given 
their particular applicant pools.  Creating a model to assess the poten-
tial impact of such an approach would also require an investment of 
resources, personnel, and time.  Accepting applicants with lower cre-
dentials than the standard applicant could impact an institution’s U.S. 
News & World Report ranking — a possibility that may influence  
an institution’s willingness to weight educational disadvantage given 
that most selective institutions are determined to maintain their  
rankings.222 
Finally, the success of such a program would be dependent on of-
fering sufficient academic and financial support for students who were 
admitted in part due to the educational disadvantage that they experi-
enced.  Racial disparities in the quality of high schools have been 
shown to influence the postsecondary achievement gap.223  Institutions 
would need to invest resources in and provide support for students 
who experienced educational disadvantage to enable these students to 
succeed.224  This support would build on research showing that some 
disadvantaged students can be successful at selective postsecondary in-
stitutions.225  Although socioeconomically disadvantaged students are 
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 222 See Guinier, supra note 1, at 144–45 (discussing how rankings “exercise significant influence 
over educational institutions,” id. at 145). 
 223 Jason Fletcher & Marta Tienda, Race and Ethnic Differences in College Achievement: Does 
High School Attended Matter?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2010, at 144, 161 
(“Our main hypothesis — that differences in the quality of high schools attended by minority ver-
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support.”).  
 224 Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Assessing the “Mismatch” Hypothesis: Differences in College 
Graduation Rates by Institutional Selectivity, 78 SOC. EDUC. 294, 309 (2005). 
 225 See JENNIFER GIANCOLA & RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, JACK KENT COOKE 
FOUND., TRUE MERIT: ENSURING OUR BRIGHTEST STUDENTS HAVE ACCESS TO OUR 
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tion efforts, particularly counseling, that selective institutions offer); Alon & Tienda, supra note 
224, at 306, 309.  For instance, evidence from Texas indicates that African American and Hispanic 
students as well as disadvantaged students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan typically 
earned lower test scores than “[w]hite students and graduates from affluent and feeder high 
schools ranked at or below the third decile of their class.”  Sunny X. Niu & Marta Tienda, Minor-
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less likely to complete college and sometimes experience lower grades 
than their more advantaged peers,226 research reveals that the gradua-
tion rates of socioeconomically disadvantaged students increase as the 
selectivity of the institution increases.227  Furthermore, given that ac-
ceptance rates for graduate and professional schools increase as the se-
lectivity of an applicant’s postsecondary institution increases and that 
students at more selective institutions experience a small advantage in 
wage earnings when compared to students at less selective institu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ity Student Academic Performance Under the Uniform Admission Law: Evidence from the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 44, 64 (2010).  Yet the 
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parts.”  Id. at 64–65; see also id. at 55–57.  But see RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., 
MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, 
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what the authors call “mismatch,” that is, research indicating that “large racial preferences back-
fire against many and, perhaps, most recipients, to the point that they learn less and are likely to 
be less self-confident than had they gone to less competitive but still quite good schools,” id. at 3–
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his coauthor.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Response, Does Affirmative Action Reduce 
the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005) (“While the mismatch hy-
pothesis is plausible, this response refutes the claim that affirmative action has reduced the num-
ber of black lawyers.  We find no persuasive evidence that current levels of affirmative action 
have reduced the probability that black law students will become lawyers.”); David L. Chambers 
et al., Response, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An 
Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1898 (2005) (“In his con-
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without racial preferences,’ because African American law students, no longer ‘mismatched’ at 
the schools they attend, would graduate and pass the bar at much higher rates.  His conclusions 
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Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 476 
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ta and Theory Behind “Mismatch,” 92 TEX. L. REV. 895, 896 (2014) (reviewing SANDER & 
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 226 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., POSTSECONDARY AT-
TAINMENT: DIFFERENCES BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 1 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs 
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 227 Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selec-
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HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 108–09 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004). 
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tions,228 increasing the admission of and support for educationally dis-
advantaged students could enable more disadvantaged students to ex-
perience the benefits of attending a selective institution. 
Despite these costs, the benefits of providing an admissions ad-
vantage based on a complete picture of the nature and scope of educa-
tional disadvantage warrant its consideration by most institutions.  In-
stitutions should consider these benefits especially given the 
widespread nature of educational disadvantage and evidence that 
many colleges and universities do not consider educational disad-
vantage.229  Such an approach would yield numerous benefits.  First, 
an admissions advantage for educational disadvantage recognizes the 
reality that “individual college opportunity is predicated on K-12 insti-
tutional opportunity.”230  Many students are hindered in their ability to 
enter and succeed in higher education because their elementary and 
secondary education prepared them only for low-skilled, low-paying 
jobs.  Economic forecasts indicate that such jobs will continue to di-
minish and that high-level thinking skills will be essential for success-
ful employment.231  Postsecondary education provides an essential way 
to develop these skills.232  Assigning a positive weight to educational 
disadvantage helps to mitigate the impact of educational opportunity 
gaps. 
Second, this approach might also encourage more low-income stu-
dents to apply to selective postsecondary institutions.  Research reveals 
that low-income students are more likely to attend two-year colleges or 
no college than high-income peers while students with a higher socio-
economic status are more likely to attend a selective four-year col-
lege.233  However, the weighting of educational disadvantage does not 
guarantee admission as the percentage plans do.  Thus, this approach 
should substantially reduce any perverse incentives to keep children in 
low-quality schools.  Although some parents may be willing to leave 
their child in an inferior educational environment to gain an admis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 Id. at 109–15. 
 229 See CLINEDINST, supra note 203, at 27–28, 34–35 (failing to include educational disad-
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 230 Patricia M. McDonough, Counseling and College Counseling in America’s High Schools, in 
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 231 Bailey, supra note 140, at 74, 78–79, 92–93. 
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sions advantage, most parents will understand that obtaining the best 
educational opportunities for their child is the greatest way to ensure 
their child’s acceptance to and success in postsecondary education. 
Third, providing an admissions advantage to students from educa-
tionally disadvantaged high schools also allows universities to serve 
their larger social responsibilities, including supporting democratic 
ideals of equal opportunity and fairness, promoting societal mobility, 
and preparing leaders for a wider array of communities.234  Some col-
leges and universities are increasing their emphasis on how students 
contribute to the lives of others at home and in their communities.235  
Acknowledging and valuing educational disadvantage provides a tan-
gible way for universities to signal that they are acting to promote the 
common good.  In addition, this approach would increase the relative-
ly small number of institutions that give a systemic preference to dis-
advantaged students.236 
Fourth, by considering educational disadvantage in admissions, 
universities would be in a stronger position to address the Court’s in-
sistence that universities establish that no viable race-neutral alterna-
tives are available to achieve diversity’s benefits.237  Systematic con-
sideration of educational disadvantage would serve as evidence that a 
university has heeded the Court’s instruction to learn from states 
where affirmative action has been prohibited.238  The opposition to af-
firmative action will undoubtedly continue and universities must be 
prepared with ample evidence that they explored alternative ap-
proaches that avoided considering an applicant’s race. 
Fifth, some universities that consider educational disadvantage as a 
positive admissions factor could reduce their reliance on affirmative 
action.  Such a reduction would be a positive development for institu-
tions given Fisher II’s instruction that “a hallmark of narrow tailor-
ing” should be that “race consciousness played a role in only a small 
portion of admissions decisions.”239 
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 237 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
 238 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).  For a discussion of postsecondary admis-
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Finally, the additional assistance required for students who have 
experienced educational disadvantage also could incentivize university 
leaders to serve as advocates for effective K-12 reforms that reduce the 
need for and costs of college and university support of these students.  
Some universities have already begun to take on such reforms by part-
nering with elementary and secondary schools in ways that can im-
prove student outcomes.240  Universities possess a wide array of re-
sources that can help disadvantaged schools, including faculty and 
staff expertise, extensive libraries, athletic facilities, and student volun-
teers.  Partnerships would be encouraged as universities and colleges 
increase their understanding of the breadth of educational disad-
vantage.  Furthermore, increasing the number of students at selective 
institutions who experienced educational disadvantage could expose all 
students to a broader array of elementary and secondary backgrounds 
in ways that contribute to the learning experiences in classrooms and 
on campuses. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this approach for enhancing diversi-
ty will depend on a variety of factors that vary by institution.  In some 
applicant pools, educational disadvantage may disproportionately 
harm minority applicants, and this approach would enhance the diver-
sity of the entering class.  In other applicant pools, educational disad-
vantage may be spread evenly among the races or may disproportion-
ately impact white applicants such that diversity will not be enhanced 
by assigning it an admissions preference.  A selective state institution 
in Mississippi or Alabama may have greater success in employing this 
alternative than a state institution in Massachusetts or Connecticut 
due to the higher number of minorities241 and the historical conver-
gence of discrimination and educational disadvantage in the first two 
states.242   
Research confirms that some selective institutions have been able to 
consider socioeconomic disadvantage in ways that enhance diversity.243  
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Research also indicates that some selective institutions would not be 
able to consider socioeconomic disadvantage in ways that enhance di-
versity, and that consequently these institutions may not benefit from a 
sophisticated assessment of educational disadvantage.244  For example, 
a university with a national applicant pool that receives a larger num-
ber of white applicants that have experienced educational disad-
vantage than minority applicants may have less success employing this 
tool.  The disparate results from the research suggest that, although 
this approach will not yield diversity’s benefits for all institutions, it 
may prove fruitful at some institutions as a way to reduce or eliminate 
their reliance on affirmative action.245 
Ultimately, reducing or eliminating the reliance of postsecondary 
institutions on affirmative action is unlikely to occur on a wide scale 
until the nation addresses the opportunity and achievement gaps that 
lead many institutions to employ affirmative action.  Therefore, I offer 
in the next Part a comprehensive approach for closing these gaps. 
III.  A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CLOSE THE 
OPPORTUNITY GAPS THAT ENCOURAGE  
THE USE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Although numerous scholars have argued that the use of affirma-
tive action should not be of limited duration,246 the Court’s affirmative 
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action jurisprudence establishes that the end of affirmative action is 
more likely a question of when, rather than if.  Indeed, the Court’s 
2003 opinion in Grutter stated that “[w]e expect that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further 
the interest approved today.”247  Even if the Court does not demand 
that all affirmative action in selective admissions end in 2028 because 
this statement “reflected an expectation . . . rather than a holding or a 
mere hope” that affirmative action will one day no longer be need-
ed,248 the Court has consistently required the use of race to be of a lim-
ited duration.249  This requirement helps to move society to the day 
when government consideration of race will end and reinforces the re-
quirement that race should only be considered as long as it is neces-
sary.250  Therefore, although Fisher II’s guidance and assistance to in-
stitutions may help to extend affirmative action beyond 2028,251 the 
Court has already tolled the death knell for affirmative action.252  In 
addition, as I explored above, the ways that Fisher II reinforces and 
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strengthens the demanding evidentiary burden for affirmative action 
may help to usher in its demise.253 
Neither Fisher I nor Fisher II explicitly mentioned the durational 
requirement or discussed how the Court will examine this requirement 
in the future.  In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy reminded the University 
that despite some measure of deference to universities on whether pur-
suing the benefits of diversity was essential to the University’s mission, 
“[t]he higher education dynamic does not change the narrow tailoring 
analysis of strict scrutiny applicable in other contexts.”254  In Fisher II, 
Justice Kennedy noted that the University engages in periodic review 
of its admissions program and thus perhaps viewed this as sufficient to 
satisfy Grutter’s durational limit requirement, which merely required 
“sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic 
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to 
achieve student body diversity.”255  Justice Kennedy twice admonished 
the University to continue to review data to assess whether its admis-
sions approach is fair, to determine if changing demographics have re-
duced the need to consider race, and to study the positive and negative 
effects of its use of affirmative action.256  Thus, one possible read of 
Fisher II is that the Court was satisfied that this requirement was met 
in light of its instruction that the University continue its periodic re-
views and the fact that 2028 has not yet been reached. 
As I argue above, the Court should not consider ending affirmative 
action until the opportunity and achievement gaps have narrowed 
such that race-neutral admissions typically produce a diverse student 
body or until new and effective race-neutral alternatives have been de-
veloped.257  This endpoint recognizes that one of the principal reasons 
institutions rely on affirmative action is the achievement gap among 
applicants.258  However, this suggested endpoint also acknowledges 
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 254 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
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that even when the achievement gap closes, institutions may need to 
engage in some limited consideration of race to ensure diversity. 
Efforts to close achievement gaps must focus first on closing the 
opportunity gaps that cause them.259  Therefore, the United States 
should undertake a comprehensive reform agenda to close educational 
opportunity gaps for its own sake, but also as an aid to reducing or 
eliminating the need for affirmative action.  I present two critical as-
pects of this reform agenda here.  First, the federal government should 
lead the implementation of a comprehensive reform agenda for closing 
opportunity and achievement gaps.  Second, the Court should revisit 
and overturn the Rodriguez decision to provide a federal judicial rem-
edy for disparities in educational opportunity.260  Neither of these re-
sponses alone will end the opportunity and achievement gaps that 
make affirmative action necessary.  However, when considered togeth-
er, these recommendations could reduce the need for affirmative action 
and bring us closer to a day when affirmative action is no longer  
needed. 
A.  Embracing a Comprehensive Federal Response  
to the Opportunity and Achievement Gaps 
The federal government must establish equal access to an excellent 
education as an urgent national priority.261  This goal insists that edu-
cational opportunity be distributed based on both student needs and 
the common pursuit of excellence for all children in the United States, 
rather than based on zip code, class, or race.262  All children deserve 
no less than equal access to an excellent education that prepares them 
to succeed in postsecondary education or a career and fully nurtures 
their abilities.263  The federal government is well equipped to prioritize 
educational excellence and equity through the use of the bully pulpit 
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and multimedia outlets that call attention to this issue.264  Historically, 
the federal government has demonstrated its capacity to emphasize the 
importance of education reform to the nation, including during the 
adoption of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965265 
and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001266 (NCLB).267 
To lead this effort, the federal government must draw on its 
strengths in education policymaking, as I have discussed in my prior 
scholarship proposing a theory for disrupting education federalism.268  
I define education federalism as the balance of power between the fed-
eral and state government over education that favors state autonomy 
over education.269  I propose substantially shifting this balance of 
power in ways that enable the federal government to serve as the ul-
timate guarantor of equity and excellence in education.270  To accom-
plish this shift, the federal government would build on such strengths 
as supporting and disseminating rigorous, objective research on effec-
tive state and local approaches for ensuring educational equity and ex-
cellence, as well as research on surmounting various obstacles to effec-
tive reform.271  The federal government should also supply technical 
assistance to states and districts in order to assist them in executing 
comprehensive reform.272  NCLB revealed that many state agencies 
lacked the expertise to implement substantive education reform and 
instead were more accustomed to distributing funding and monitoring 
how it was spent.273  Technical assistance can expand the capacity of 
states and localities for reform and offer insights from other states and 
localities that would encourage greater efficiency in reforms.274  Feder-
al financial assistance also could provide both incentives and assis-
tance for providing equal access to an excellent education.275  Such as-
sistance will be critical for gaining buy-in for comprehensive reform 
and for encouraging states and localities to raise the quality of the 
most disadvantaged schools rather than lowering the quality of more 
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privileged schools.276  My theory also adds a needed layer of federal 
accountability for equitable distribution of an excellent education.277 
By undertaking this substantial shift in education federalism, the 
United States could implement a comprehensive education reform 
agenda that ensures equal access to an excellent education.278  Insis-
tence on state and local control of education and limited federal influ-
ence has operated as a shield that has insulated states from meaningful 
federal accountability, despite the fact that states have refused to im-
plement the extensive reforms that are needed to provide an excellent 
and equitable education to all children.279  The nation’s longstanding 
approach to education federalism reveals numerous shortcomings that 
indicate that a new approach is needed.280  Education federalism has 
hindered efforts to advance equal educational opportunity.281  For in-
stance, education federalism drove the Court’s insistence on a quick 
return to local control of public schools after a relatively short deseg-
regation effort to remedy the longstanding denial and segregation of 
education for African American children.282  Education federalism also 
limited the ability of Congress to establish a national floor for state 
standards or for teachers in NCLB and thus left the states free to 
adopt relatively weak academic and teacher-qualification standards.283  
Education federalism’s emphasis on state and local control of edu-
cation also has not reaped some of the benefits that it is designed to 
achieve.284  State and local control can encourage excellence, experi-
mentalism, and responsiveness to local needs.285  However, local con-
trol is not an end in itself but merely a method for achieving these 
benefits.286  For example, the funding systems of most states do not 
distribute greater funding to districts with higher concentrations of 
poverty, despite research demonstrating that students in these districts 
need additional resources to compete successfully with their more priv-
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ileged peers.287  Instead, fourteen states deliver less funding to districts 
with greater concentrations of poverty, eighteen states deliver the same 
funding, and only sixteen states provide more funding.288  This reveals 
a fundamental unwillingness, or at least an inability, of most states to 
meet the educational needs of students within their states and to dis-
tribute funding in an equitable manner.  Research also demonstrates 
that many states provide quite low per-pupil funding levels289 and do 
not include mechanisms for overseeing the efficient use of resources.290  
Students within the United States at all income levels perform signifi-
cantly and pervasively below their international peers in Asia, Europe, 
and some other countries in the Americas.291  This evidence indicates 
that the laboratory of the states is generally failing to provide the ex-
cellent and equitable schools that the nation’s schoolchildren need and 
deserve and that the United States needs to thrive. 
Local control has greatly diminished in recent decades and thus en-
joys only a circumscribed existence in school districts today.292  Never-
theless, local control that sparks innovation, parental and teacher in-
volvement, and tailoring of educational opportunities to the needs of 
children must be maintained.  While beneficial forms of state and local 
control of education should be preserved,293 the United States must 
simultaneously declare that the autonomy to shortchange some chil-
dren while privileging others has come to an end.  Instead, the United 
States should adopt a new understanding of education federalism that 
embraces federal leadership for a federal-state partnership that ensures 
equal access to an excellent education for all children. 
Despite federalism-based concerns over this increase in federal in-
fluence over education as too great a reduction in state and local con-
trol, my approach would retain a number of features that recognize 
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federalism’s potential benefits.  My proposal retains most of the exist-
ing forms of state and local control of education.  It does not embrace 
a national schoolhouse or federalize our education system.  Instead, it 
insists that states equitably distribute educational opportunities and 
provide all children an excellent education.  In addition, my theory for 
disrupting education federalism would empower new forms of state 
and local control for those communities who have lacked the influence 
to demand an excellent and equitable education for their children.294  
This theory admittedly and intentionally ends a state’s ability to dis-
tribute resources in an inequitable and irrational manner that harms 
both disadvantaged children and the nation’s interest in an educated 
citizenry and workforce.  However, states would retain primary control 
of education as each state would select the best path for it to ensure 
equal access to an excellent education. 
B.  Overturning Rodriguez 
To be most effective, a comprehensive federal agenda requires the 
assistance of all three branches of government.  The executive branch 
enjoys the fewest obstacles to reform because it could use its existing 
authority to accomplish incremental shifts to education federalism 
through modest reforms that employ its existing authority and re-
sources.295  Nevertheless, given the full scope of the shift to education 
federalism that I recommend, reforms instituted without any signifi-
cant involvement of Congress or the Court would lack the comprehen-
sive nature that ensuring equal access to an excellent education for all 
schoolchildren will ultimately demand.  Legislation consistent with this 
agenda would send an even more powerful message that the agenda 
represents the will of the people and thus may encourage greater state 
and local buy-in.296  However, the eight-year delay in reenacting the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which eventually 
led to the reduction of the federal role in education in the Every Stu-
dent Succeeds Act,297 and the great difficulties that Congress is experi-
encing in passing legislation298 suggest that legislative reform con-
sistent with my proposal is unlikely in the near term. 
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Fortunately, the Court possesses the authority to unleash a power-
ful tool that could help to reduce the opportunity and achievement 
gaps that lead universities and colleges to rely on affirmative action in 
admissions.  It could overturn Rodriguez, which held that the Consti-
tution does not protect education as a fundamental right.299 
For over forty years, Rodriguez has served as a roadblock to access 
to federal courts for those who hope to address the entrenched dispari-
ties in funding and resources that relegate many disadvantaged and 
minority students to inferior educational opportunities in the United 
States.300  Because the Court held that education was not a fundamen-
tal right, Rodriguez applied rational basis review to the funding gaps 
between districts within Texas.301  The Court determined that Texas 
easily met this standard because its funding approach advanced local 
control of education, the Court lacked the expertise to second-guess the 
Texas system, and a ruling for the plaintiffs would greatly upset the 
balance of federalism.302  The Court nonetheless noted the need for  
reform of school funding and challenged the states to undertake this 
reform.303  Although many states have implemented funding reform 
since Rodriguez and state litigation has resulted in some important vic-
tories, these state efforts have fallen far short of the reforms required 
to provide all children equal access to an excellent education.304  In 
light of the continuing disparities in educational opportunity, numer-
ous scholars, myself included, have argued that Rodriguez was wrong-
ly decided and should be overturned to provide a consistent and pow-
erful federal remedy to address these disparities.305 
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However, disagreement exists over the scope of the right that the 
Court should recognize.  The Court left the existence of a fundamental 
right to some minimum education an open question in Rodriguez306 
and subsequently acknowledged that the question remains open.307  If 
Rodriguez is overturned, some scholars envision the Court addressing 
only extreme forms of educational inequality by providing a federal 
right to a minimally adequate education.308  Leading education scholar 
Professor Derek Black, on the other hand, has argued that such an ed-
ucation today would require that students receive the state-defined 
minimum of education and that this definition does not have to equal 
“a minimalist education.”309 
Given the likelihood that the Court will insist that affirmative ac-
tion eventually end, the Court should take some responsibility for ad-
dressing the conditions that lead institutions to rely on affirmative ac-
tion by overturning the decision that insulated opportunity gaps from 
federal accountability.  The Court could choose from a variety of con-
stitutional provisions to recognize a right to education.310  For in-
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stance, the Court could hold that the Fourteenth Amendment’s re-
quirement that states not deny equal protection of the laws311 serves as 
a prohibition of the inequitable state disparities in educational oppor-
tunity or guarantees students an education that enables them to effec-
tively employ their First Amendment rights and to be competent vot-
ers.312  Recognizing and enforcing a federal right to education would 
provide greater authority and consistent impact than the state educa-
tion clauses that vary widely in their protection — or lack thereof — 
of the right to education.313  The federal courts have been and will re-
main an important and powerful avenue for enforcing education rights 
for all students throughout the United States in ways that do not make 
the content of a right dependent on the happenstance of geography or 
state law.314  A federal constitutional right also would enable the fed-
eral courts to address the substantial interstate disparities in funding 
that currently account for seventy-eight percent of per-pupil spending 
gaps.315  This tremendous interstate disparity, which has reached a 
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“historic high” for spending differences,316 reveals the failure of state 
courts to close spending gaps on their own.317 
If the Court chooses to overturn Rodriguez in a manner that would 
help to close opportunity gaps, it should incorporate four essential 
principles into a constitutional right to education.  First, the Court 
must embrace a robust fundamental right to education that moves be-
yond guaranteeing a rudimentary floor of educational opportunity.  A 
minimal right would not make a meaningful impact on opportunity or 
achievement gaps.  Instead, the Court should consider recognizing a 
right to education that requires states to provide an education-based 
justification for the quality of education provided and any disparities 
in educational opportunity.  Such a standard would enable states to of-
fer disparate opportunities to students with disabilities, English-
language learners, and low-income children, but would force states to 
end the superior opportunities that are provided to wealthier children 
absent an educational justification for such disparities.  Defining a 
fundamental right to education in this way would help to level the 
playing field within public schools and insist that states design educa-
tion systems based on research and students’ needs rather than power, 
politics, and privilege. 
Second, the Court should include safeguards that reduce the likeli-
hood that states level down their educational opportunities318 or seek 
to avoid the Court’s requirements.319  One safeguard could be an in-
struction to states that guaranteeing a federal right to education should 
avoid reducing the quality and nature of existing educational opportu-
nities and instead should seek ways to expand the delivery of a high-
quality education to those who are currently denied it.  The Court also 
can reduce the likelihood of decreasing the quality of educational op-
portunities within a state by providing clear requirements on the na-
ture of the education right.  In this regard, the Court can learn from 
decades of school finance litigation that has worked to give meaning to 
the right to education embodied in state constitutions,320 while recog-
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nizing that this litigation has had significant shortcomings and has not 
ultimately resulted in equal access to an excellent education for all 
children.321 
Third, the Court must acknowledge that a constitutional right to 
education would shift education federalism in ways that would in-
crease federal influence over education and reduce some aspects of 
state control over education.  The Court must wrestle with its own 
prior pronouncements heralding the importance of local control of ed-
ucation.322  Such a shift in an area of traditional state control must be 
justified with an explanation for why this shift is both appropriate and 
warranted.323 
When the Court provides this explanation, it should remind the 
states that Rodriguez urged state reform of school finance systems in 
light of the persistent and heavy reliance on property taxes and the 
disparities in educational opportunity.324  The limited nature and im-
pact of subsequent reforms remains apparent in light of the Equity 
and Excellence Commission’s finding in 2013 that “students, families 
and communities are burdened by the broken system of education 
funding in America.”325  The Commission further noted that over forty 
years of reforms “have not addressed the fundamental sources of ineq-
uities and so have not generated the educational gains desired.”326  
Scholars also have recognized the limited success of decades of funding 
litigation to remedy longstanding inequitable disparities in educational 
opportunity.327  School funding data and research also confirm a  
host of shortcomings in state funding systems despite the Court’s invi-
tation to reform funding in ways that increase equal educational  
opportunities.328  
In addition to the shortcomings noted above, most states have not 
designed their funding systems to accomplish their education goals.329  
Instead, politics oftentimes drives the distribution of funding as state 
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politicians assess how much funding is available for a given school 
year and then bargain over how that amount should be divided among 
the students in the state.330  When the Court acknowledges that its de-
cision will result in a shift in education federalism, it also should 
acknowledge that the laboratory of the states has failed to develop the 
reforms needed to ensure an equitable and excellent education for ev-
ery child. 
Fourth, the Court must acknowledge that recognizing a constitu-
tional right to education would only begin the process of closing op-
portunity and achievement gaps.  The reform of funding systems and 
the redistribution of educational opportunity will take a significant 
amount of time.  The Court will need to encourage lower courts to re-
tain jurisdiction over cases enforcing this right, just as state courts  
typically retain jurisdiction over cases enforcing a state right to  
education.331 
In this regard, the Court must avoid the errors of its desegregation 
cases, which initially insisted on effective desegregation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s,332 but then eventually emphasized the return to 
local control of schools rather than the effectiveness of desegregation 
orders.  For example, in Milliken v. Bradley,333 the Court overturned 
an interdistrict desegregation plan for the metropolitan Detroit area in 
part because the plan’s inclusion of districts surrounding Detroit 
would cause a reduction in local control.334  The Court took this action 
in spite of the Sixth Circuit’s finding that crossing district boundaries 
was particularly appropriate given the state’s discrimination that 
maintained racial segregation across school district boundaries and 
that failing to include the surrounding districts would “nullify” Brown 
v. Board of Education.335  As I have explored in prior work, the 
Court’s desegregation decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma 
City Public Schools v. Dowell,336 Freeman v. Pitts,337 and Missouri v. 
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Jenkins338 also reified local control of the schools by focusing on releas-
ing districts from court supervision rather than on effective and lasting 
school desegregation.339  Scholars have documented how these cases 
signaled that the Court had determined that desegregation had gone 
on long enough and it was time for school boards to regain control 
even if desegregation was never ultimately accomplished.340 
If a federal right to education is going to serve as a mechanism to 
close educational opportunity gaps and to reduce the need for selective 
institutions to rely on consideration of an applicant’s race to achieve 
diversity’s benefits, the Court must learn from how its desegregation 
decisions undeniably contributed to the racial isolation that pervades 
so many school districts today.341  The Court’s impatience with the 
slow nature of desegregation reveals a shallow understanding of the 
depth of the social ill that the Court declared unconstitutional in 
Brown and an unwillingness to insist upon ongoing federal court  
investment in the effective dismantling of segregation.  Overturning  
Rodriguez will require the Court to confront longstanding and deeply 
entrenched inequalities within public education.  The federal courts 
will be called upon to oversee reforms that topple the settled expecta-
tions of more privileged sectors of society, just as the Court confronted 
the expectations of racism and white privilege that supported racial 
segregation.  Thus, the reforms required by the Court cannot give a 
wink and a nod to those who benefit from the status quo while simul-
taneously claiming to demand reform. 
The Court must eschew any approval of unwarranted delay, as oc-
curred in Brown II’s command to desegregate with “all deliberate 
speed,”342 or any invitation to incomplete or ineffective results, as  
the Court sanctioned in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins.343  Instead, the 
Court must insist that states implement the reforms that will ensure 
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equal access to an excellent education.  It must make clear that states 
will not be released from court oversight until they have done so.  
Consistent Supreme Court insistence on an excellent and equitable ed-
ucation for all children will provide lower federal courts the support 
that they will need both to confront state legislatures that resist chang-
ing the status quo and to prevent evasive actions similar to those invit-
ed by the Court’s ambiguous pronouncements in Brown II.344 
In sum, a federal right to education that embraces these principles 
provides the most promising path toward closing opportunity and 
achievement gaps such that selective postsecondary institutions may 
not be required to consider race to achieve diversity’s benefits.345  Un-
less the Court overturns Rodriguez, the Court will remain complicit 
with the deeply entrenched educational opportunity gaps and should 
not blame postsecondary institutions that must build diverse institu-
tions despite those gaps. 
CONCLUSION 
Fisher I and II wear two faces: one nodding approvingly at the 
University of Texas’s plan and another casting a skeptical eye toward 
future challenges.  On one face, Fisher II placed the Court’s imprima-
tur on the admissions plan at the University in ways that will enable it 
to serve as a guide for other institutions that must defend their use of 
affirmative action.346  Fisher II’s analysis regarding the absence of a 
need to reduce the goal of diversity to actual numbers, the types of ev-
idence that the Court will consider persuasive, and the deficiencies of 
percentage plans can assist institutions that employ affirmative action.  
Yet the Fisher decisions’ other face is one that reinforced and 
strengthened the evidentiary requirements in Grutter in ways that may 
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make it more difficult for institutions to succeed in constitutional chal-
lenges.  Ending any possible deference in the narrow tailoring analysis, 
proving the absence of any viable race-neutral alternatives, expecting 
numerous types of data to justify the decision to consider race, and 
identifying the limited impact of race as a “hallmark” of narrow tailor-
ing for affirmative action may create new hurdles for defending af-
firmative action.347  
The best response to the mixed message of the Fisher cases is to 
examine and remedy the root causes that lead institutions to rely on 
affirmative action.  Educational opportunity gaps serve as a primary 
impetus for enduring achievement gaps.348  As long as opportunity 
gaps persist, postsecondary institutions could consider educational dis-
advantage as a positive race-neutral admissions factor that may help 
them advance diversity.  Such an approach might enable an institution 
to reduce or eliminate its consideration of an applicant’s race, or at 
minimum provide further evidence that it examined all race-neutral 
alternatives. 
The United States has not undertaken a comprehensive and sus-
tained effort to ensure that all children receive equal access to an ex-
cellent education.349  Furthermore, although the Court has insisted 
that affirmative action must eventually end,350 Rodriguez closed the 
federal courthouse to challenges to disparities in educational oppor-
tunity.351  Ultimately, the federal government must undertake a com-
prehensive effort that partners with states and localities to ensure 
equal access to an excellent education.  The Court should overturn 
Rodriguez as an important component of this comprehensive effort.  
Until educational opportunity and achievement gaps are closed, the 
Court should not insist on an end to affirmative action. 
Even if the Court declared its willingness for affirmative action to 
continue indefinitely, the United States should undertake comprehen-
sive reforms that ensure equal access to an excellent education as a 
matter of fundamental fairness,352 economic self-interest,353 democratic  
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engagement,354 national security,355 and moral imperative.356  The con-
sequences that the United States currently suffers from its mediocre 
education system are much too costly357 and too often are dispropor-
tionately borne by those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, 
people of color, or both.358  The urgent need for comprehensive educa-
tion reform is also undeniable given research showing that even rela-
tively privileged children are performing poorly compared to their in-
ternational peers.359  The United States holds within its grasp the 
power to change the destiny of its children and ultimately the nation.  
Let us work tirelessly to urge the United States to take hold of this 
power with both hands and to insist on an excellent and equitable ed-
ucation for all of its children.  
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